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Summary
Offshore  structures  operate  for  decades  in  harsh  environment.  They  are  exposed  to  extreme
environmental loads and degradation effects. Changes in configuration,  weights and operational
condition represent also a challenge. Lost knowledge and experience over time due to personnel
leaving  companies,  unregistered  or  unmitigated  changes,  suboptimal  inspection  procedures  and
schedules may affect cost effective and safe operation.
Structural Integrity Management (SIM) is the process to ensure compliance with regulatory and
company  requirements  over  time,  and  thus  ensure  the  structure  is  fit-for-purpose  until
decommissioning or removal. The SIM process involves systematic filing of all important historical
information for later easy retrieval. This information relates to fabrication, structural assessments,
inspection findings, modification or life-extension projects. It also forms a framework for scheduled
and unscheduled inspections.
Barriers are used in the risk analysis and risk management regimes of socio-technical systems in
order to help tackling the problems and diversities connected to accidents in a systematic way.
Barriers are intentionally planned functions to prevent,  control or mitigate the propagation of a
hazardous event from making harm or reach its full consequences. It is common to have a series of
barriers, each implementing a particular function, the serial sum of which is intended to cover all
the foreseeable failure scenarios connected to the hazard.
Robustness is desirable property in structures and systems. Robustness is the quality that defines
how structures behave outside their operational envelope and their potential to survive accidents.
From a  strictly  structural  point  of  view,  robustness  mitigates  the  susceptibility  of  progressive
collapse, i.e. no damage disproportionate to the initial failure should occur. If robustness is defined
with the use of barriers, it  means such a layered defense system that is aimed to prevent initial
damage and to hinder  hazards from propagation,  hence limit  the consequences  on humans,  the
environment and assets.
In the thesis it is shown that the purpose of SIM – ensuring suitability and safety – requires the SIM
standards to incorporate and put emphasis on robustness and barriers.
SIMS, the software product of DNV GL is also presented in the thesis. SIMS is a supporting tool for
Structural Integrity Management processes that was created to be a change management database.
SIMS  integrates  the  Survey  changes,  Assess  changes,  Find  information  and  Ensure  integrity
functions. SIMS is able to handle a large portfolio of platforms in a resource effective way, with
adequate care to information security. The aim of SIMS is integrity assurance which is achieved by
barrier control with full compliance to NORSOK standards.
To  demonstrate  numerical  calculations  in  connection  with  structural  robustness,  a  member
consequence calculation of an offshore bridge with truss girders is performed.
Page: 5 of 75
Structural Integrity Management ensuring robustness and barriers
Istvan Szarka
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors Gerhard Ersdal (UiS) and Ingar Scherf
(DNV GL)  who  both  helped  choosing  the  topic  of  this  thesis  and  provided  advice,  guidance,
materials and full support during the completion of it.
I would also like to thank Michael Hall (ConocoPhillips Norway) who granted me access to many
valuable  sources  of  information  as  well  as  agreed that  I  could  use  the  SIMS software  in  this
semester and I can include it in my thesis.
In connection with the SIMS software and other topics of the thesis, I also feel grateful for many
colleagues and friends at DNV GL who gave suggestions, opinions, and answers to my questions.
I  also feel  obliged  to  InterCad Ltd,  who provided access  to  the full  version of  their  structural
engineering analysis software AxisVM free of charge for the time of this thesis.
And I cannot say enough thanks to the woman of my life, Marta, who showed endless patience and
understanding for the ups and downs in the course of writing this thesis.
15 June 2015
István Szarka
Page: 6 of 75
Structural Integrity Management ensuring robustness and barriers
Istvan Szarka
1  Introduction
1.1  Objective of the thesis
The thesis is organized around the topics of Structural Integrity Management (SIM), barriers and
robustness. The objective of this thesis is:
• to investigate and evaluate what role SIM has in structural safety,
• to find out what methods and activities SIM involves to achieve its goals
• to find similarities in and differences between standards that describe a SIM process (API,
ISO, NORSOK)
• to see if the methods and principles currently incorporated in SIM standards can fulfill their
goal
• to introduce and critically evaluate an example of a software database tool that supports the
SIM process (DNV GL's SIMS)
• to study what kind of connection there is between SIM and barrier concept, to examine if
current SIM standards include barrier philosophy
• to look at what is robustness and how it is connected to barriers or SIM, also to see if current
SIM standards set focus on robustness and if these should do that
In addition, it  is also the aim of this thesis to provide an example of numerical calculations in
connection with robustness and member consequence.
1.2  Limitations of the thesis
The management and assessment of structural integrity for existing offshore loadbearing structures
is a very broad topic. This thesis is limited to fixed offshore structures which have their activities in
connection with the oil industry.
Regarding the topics in connection with Structural Integrity Management standards, the focus is on
their  scope,  objective  and  general  principles,  management  considerations  and  general  integrity
management process descriptions. The specific regulations for topsides, jackets, concrete, column
stabilized, ship-shaped or other specific structures, as well as marine systems are not within the
scope of this thesis
The set up or necessary technical means of inspection programmes, inspection methods; methods of
damage evaluation  and specific  methods  of  assessment  of  fatigue  loading,  seismic  loading,  ice
loading, etc.; as well as platform decommissioning is also not within scope.
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1.3  Abbreviations used in the thesis
The following abbreviations are used in the text:
AAc As-is assurance compliance (DNV GL SIMS)
AAm As-is assurance model (DNV GL SIMS)
AASAS As-is Structure Analysis Summary (DNV GL SIMS)
ACT Analysis Change Task Summary (DNV GL SIMS)
ALS Accidental limit state
API American Petroleum Institute
ASIS As-is Structure Integrity Summary (DNV GL SIMS)
CAE Computer Aided Engineering
FEA Finite Element Analysis
FLS Fatigue limit state
FMD Flooded member detection
GBS Gravity based structure (DNV GL SIMS)
GEA Greater Ekofisk Area
GPS Global Positioning System
HSE Health Safety and Environment
ISO International Organization for Standardization
KPI Key Performance Indicator
LRFD Load and Resistance Factor Design
MSS Module support structure (DNV GL SIMS)
NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf
NORSOK The NORSOK standards (Norsk sokkels konkurranseposisjon)
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Petroleumtilsynet)
RBI Risk Based Inspection
RSR Reserve Strength Ratio
RP Recommended practice
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SAS Structure Analysis Summary (DNV GL SIMS)
SCA Structure Condition Anomaly (DNV GL SIMS)
SIM Structural Integrity Management (in service)
SIMS Structural Integrity Management System (product of DNV GL Software)
SIMS-a SIMS Analysis Portal (DNV GL SIMS)
SIMS-e SIMS Ensure Portal (DNV GL SIMS)
SIMS-f SIMS Find Portal (DNV GL SIMS)
SIMS-s SIMS Survey Portal (DNV GL SIMS)
ULS Ultimate limit state
WSD Working Stress Design
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2  Structural Integrity Management
2.1  Introduction
The following chapters  are  aimed to  describe  how the  definition and the process  of  Structural
Integrity  Management  (SIM)  are  defined  in  the  relevant  codes  and  regulations.  First  the
recommended  practice  for  structural  integrity  management  (API  RP2SIM)  from  the  American
Petroleum Institute /1/ together with the International Standard 19902 from ISO /2/ in section 2.2 is
the subject of investigation, afterwards the NORSOK N-005 standard /3/ together with NORSOK
N-006  /4/ in section  2.3.  Finally  DNV GL's SIM software,  which supports  the SIM process is
introduced.
Structural integrity management is a cyclic process that has been created to ensure that structures
can maintain their integrity and their prescribed safety level. Structural inspections, assessment and
maintenance are the focus points of SIM. The enabling factor to the SIM activities is the informed
decision and change management that take up-to-date and transferable data as a basis.
With the use of SIM one can prioritize inspection resources, classify structures and components on
the  basis  of  strength,  risk,  criticality,  fatigue  characteristics,  reliability  and  consequence  of  its
failure. The SIM process enables the operator to get an increased knowledge of structural assets and
their properties, as well as ensures that personnel with the adequate qualifications make assessment
of these assets, if necessary by the means of updated structural analysis models.
Although SIM is not part of the design process, it is a cradle to grave activity in the structure's
lifetime /5/ that has been brought to life by the need to tackle the challenges connected to structure
aging and deterioration processes, complex and extensive modification and life extension projects,
as well as assure safe decommissioning.
2.2  SIM using API RP2SIM /1/ and ISO19902 /2/
2.2.1  General
The reason for API RP2SIM /1/ and ISO19902 /2/ are addressed in a shared section is that the two
standards have very much in common when it comes to definitions and concepts of platform failure
consequence,  categorization  of  inspections  and structural  integrity  management  in  general.  The
main focus is  on API RP2SIM since in that case,  the whole document is  devoted to structural
integrity management.
The scope of the API RP2SIM is for fixed offshore structures built and used by the petroleum
industries. The processes could be applicable for structures located anywhere in the world, but some
specific guidance and criteria limit the practical use for the Gulf of Mexico. The SIM process itself
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defined in the RP can be used in connection with any type of structure. The API RP2SIM was
written with the intention to give guidance for platforms designed with a working stress design
(WSD) approach, but the framework is general enough to be used with a load and resistance factor
design (LRFD) method. 
In  this  thesis  the  focus  is  on  Section  4  (Structural  Integrity  Management  Process)  of  the  API
RP2SIM. That is the main chapter of the recommended practice. The other chapters in the RP deal
with detailing and providing guidance on a particular SIM task.
ISO19902 has a very similar scope, namely it defines “in-service inspection requirements for both
the underwater and above water parts of fixed steel offshore structures located anywhere in the
world, built to any design and fabrication standard, and of any age” /2, section 23.1.1/. In the case
of ISO19902 our focus is mainly limited to chapters 23, 24 and their annexes (A.23, A.24).
2.2.2  Definition of SIM used in API RP2SIM and ISO19902
Section 1.1 in API RP2SIM defines the SIM process as “SIM is a continuous process used for
demonstrating  the  fitness-for-purpose  of  an  offshore  structure  from  installation  through  to
decommissioning. SIM provides the process for understanding the effects of deterioration, damage,
changes  in  loading  and  accidental  overloading.  In  addition  SIM  provides  a  framework  for
inspection planning, maintenance, and repair of a platform or group of platforms. The SIM process
(...) consists of four primary elements: data, evaluation, strategy, and program.”. The process of
SIM described is generic, stepwise and cyclic. The SIM process is a tool for the operator to predict
the performance of the structure in ill conditions (damaged, overloaded), by a set of techniques
which include analysis, testing and monitoring. The hence understood structural behavior provides
the basis for a tailored inspection program for the entire life of the platform. Furthermore SIM
provides input to decision makings on platform future (e.g. life extension, modifications, eventual
removal).
ISO19902 describes SIM as a structured method to assure the condition of the structure in a cyclic
activity  that  deals  with  data  collection  and  evaluation,  development  of  an  inspection  strategy,
development and execution of an inspection program, and execution of repairing works. ISO19902
defines the possible benefits of a SIM program as:
• inspection resources are better utilized because structural elements on system or component
level can be prioritized on the basis of strength, risk, criticality or reliability
• becoming more knowledgeable on the structure through the review of data and assessments
by qualified personnel
• change  management  becoming  effective:  storing,  reviewing,  evaluating  of  data  enables
better assessment of consequences
• SIM enables planning both for repairs and inspections.
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Figure 2.1 The four stages of the SIM process in API RP2SIM and ISO19902, based on /1/
2.2.3  Risk based approach of API RP2SIM
The overall  strategy of  API RP2SIM, when it  comes to  inspection  criteria,  is  that  it  defines  a
inspection scope and minimum frequency based on qualitative evaluations, however it is possible to
justify reduced criteria with quantitative methods.
The SIM process can provide means to apply a risk based approach in operating platforms. Risk is
defined in the API RP2SIM as:
Risk  =  Likelihood  x  Consequence
Likelihood: by likelihood, it is meant likelihood of failure of the platform. It is (e.g.) the conditional
probability of a hurricane being of a great enough magnitude to damage the platform given there is
a hurricane in the platform area.
Consequence: the consequence is the loss due to the platform failure that either can or cannot be
measured in terms of economic loss. This is the loss of life, pollution, repairs, lost production,
unexploited hydrocarbon reserves.
The goal of the risk based approach utilized by the API RP2SIM is that higher risk platforms may
have surveys and inspections more frequently as well  as the scope and extent of the survey is
broader  than for low risk platforms. I.e.  the cost of inspections is  proportional  to  the risk that
operating the particular platform poses.
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2.2.4  Elements of the SIM loop
The  Figure 2.1, which shows the four main elements of the SIM process, can be found in API
RP2SIM (Figure 1) and in almost similar form in ISO19902 (Figure 23.1.1). It has to be noted,
however that ISO19902 makes a little addition to this figure by introducing the Design element
which provides input to the Data block, hence it emphasizes that the SIM loop represents an in-
service / operation phase.  As it was mentioned earlier, and can be seen in  Figure 2.1, the SIM
process is cyclic and continuous. This figure represents a concept that information is fed back to the
data block after inspection. That is, it is the inspection findings that bring a new element to the SIM
cycle at the next iteration. 
2.2.4.1  Data
The SIM process relies on correct, accurate and up-to-date information. Correct data is critical in
SIM. Inaccuracy or lack of information can lead to unsafe operation, conservative decisions, that
may prevent better use or modification of the platform.
Data covers all information from design, fabrication, installation and operation. The type of data can
be reports,  analyses,  results  of  inspections,  metocean information.  The stored  data  hence  must
cover:
• reports  and  eventually  models  from all  original  design  analyses  and  re-analyses  in  the
operation phase as well as analyses that document modifications
• inspection data from fabrication, transportation, installation and in-service phases
• any kind of structural modification,  weight changes, strengthening, records if any of the
other design parameters have changed (e.g. environmental)
• incidents, repairs, damage history.
It is important that in case of an owner change, all data is transferred to the new owner. The API
RP2SIM splits the stored data in two categories:
• characteristic data, which describe the as-installed condition of the platform
• condition  data,  which  contains  records  on  any  kind  of  change  that  is  of  concern  in
connection  with  the  platform,  but  also  records  on  surveys  for  corrosion  or  protection
systems even if the result was no finding.
It is possible to gain data on structural condition not only with inspections but with monitoring
systems also. These systems enable the continuous monitoring of structural response characteristics.
Changes  of  such  response  characteristics  can  indicate  degradation  of  structural  performance
(development of cracks, foundation stiffness reduction due to scour, mass distribution changes on
the deck)
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2.2.4.2  Evaluation
Evaluation is the process where the engineer(s) decide on the relevance and importance of new and
existing  data  using  their  competence.  API  RP2SIM and ISO19902 make a  distinction  between
evaluation and assessment. In  Figure 2.2 evaluation and assessment is shown in the same figure
(which is otherwise very similar to Figure 2.1). In ISO19902 there is a detailed comparison between
evaluation and assessment. The distinction between the two can be formulated as:
• Evaluation is an ongoing process and there are many forms of it. Engineering competence is
needed to decide on whether engineer judgment (experience of specialist knowledge) or a
detailed  structural  analysis  is  needed.  There  are  also  options  between  the  above  two
extremes. E.g. comparing to similar platforms, and their analyses.
• Evaluation  can  be  performed right  after  receiving  new data.  For  example  if  damage or
deterioration is found it can be evaluated if this has direct consequence being on a primary
member or not; as well as it can also be decided if the new data is not sufficient, hence if
more inspection is required, and based on the member criticality when the new inspection
will be required.
• Assessment  is  a  triggered  event  and  can  only  come  from  evaluation.  Assessment  is  a
detailed evaluation or a structural analysis
On the other hand, the two processes (evaluation and assessment) share most of the data necessary
for performing them. The assessment process is further described in section 2.2.4.3.
Figure 2.2: Assessment in the SIM process in API RP2SIM, source /1/
API RP2SIM lists a number of factors that are to be considered when the evaluation is made: “
a) platform age, condition, original design criteria
b) analysis results and assumptions for original design or subsequent assessment
c) platform reserve strength and degree of structural redundancy
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d) degree of conservatism or uncertainty in metocean criteria
e) fabrication quality and occurrence of any rework or re-welding
f) occurrence of any damage during transportation or installation
g) extent of inspection during fabrication, transportation and installation
h) in-service inspection findings (physical)
i) learning from other similar platforms
j) platform modifications, additions and repairs or strengthening
k) accidental (i.e., fire, blast, vessel impact, dropped object, etc.) or metocean or other design
event overload
l) fatigue sensitivity
m) past performance of corrosion protection system
n) criticality of platform to other operations
o) platform monitoring data” /1/
Very similar factors and issues to be considered can be found in ISO19902. These are listed in
Appendix A.
The API RP2SIM provides the possibility for the operator to utilize a risk based SIM strategy. As it
is mentioned in section 2.2.3, risk is defined as the product of likelihood and consequence. In API
RP2SIM, consequence is represented as “Exposure category”.
Figure 2.3: Risk matrix in  API RP2SIM, based on /1/
Figure 2.3 shows the basis of risk based strategy used in API RP2SIM. The goal of the risk matrix is
to  communicate  the  severity  of  the  evaluation  results.  The  recommended  practice  makes  the
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following categories of platform based on risk exposure: “
a) Risk Level 1 — Platforms that reside in this risk category should be considered for a major
focus of resources, which may include an increased inspection frequency and intensity of
inspection and/or more detailed engineering.
b) Risk Level 2 — Platforms that reside in this risk category may be considered for a moderate
focus of resources.
c) Risk Level 3 — Platforms that reside in this risk category may be considered for less focus 
of resources, which may include a reduced inspection frequency and scope of inspection.” /
1/
There are two factors in API RP2SIM that define exposure category: 
• life-safety and 
• environmental exposure/economic impact (which is named consequence category). 
Life-safety describes how much the platform is manned in the event of the maximum anticipated
environmental event:
• S-1: manned, non-evacuated: the platform is (almost) continuously manned, personnel will
not be evacuated
• S-2: manned, evacuated: the platform is (almost) continuously manned, except for when
there  is  a  forecast  extreme environmental  event.  The requirements  for  a  platform to  be
categorized as S-2 are that there should be enough resources to carry out the evacuation;
there has to be a plan on evacuation prior to the extreme environmental event; in case of the
forecast event, there is sufficient time to evacuate personnel.
• S-3: unmanned: normally not manned platforms. Platforms that have living quarters cannot
be in this category.
Consequence  categories  describe  the  extent  of  possible  environmental  damage  and cost  of  the
operator in case of platform failure:
• C-1: high consequence of failure:  for major platforms where the danger of hydrocarbon
leakage is present, either in the form of well leakage or major oil transport lines cross the
platform
• C-2: medium consequence of failure: for platforms where oil and gas production is shut
down in a design event, i.e. leakage is prevented.
• C-3: low consequence of failure: production is shut down in a design event, minimal oil
storage limited to functionality needs.
In Figure 2.4 the combination of consequence category and life-safety categories are shown, from
which the appropriate exposure category can be selected.
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It can also be seen in Figure 2.4 that life-safety is an independent category within the consequence
of failure. This results in that life-safety has an increased importance (e.g. the S-1 category sets
exposure category to L-1, independently of consequence category).
Figure 2.4: Exposure categories from Life-safety and Consequence, based on /1/
For the likelihood of failure in Figure 2.3, the API RP2SIM defines three categories. The likelihood
of failure is proportionate to the reserve strength ratio (RSR), i.e. how much the forces from the
extreme event could be scaled up so that the platform is still not failing globally.
The API RP2SIM gives the possibility to define the likelihood of failure either quantitatively, semi
quantitatively or only qualitatively. The result of this evaluation puts the platform in one of the
following three likelihood categories:
• high likelihood: RSR<1.0, i.e. it is likely that the platform will not survive the design event
(100 year return period)
• medium likelihood:  platforms  that  are  neither  low of  high  likelihood  of  failure.  It  is  a
requirement that they are not expected to fail in the design event
• low likelihood: these platforms are not to be damaged and are very unlikely to fail in a
design event.
ISO19902 makes the same categorizations with respect to life-safety, consequence or exposure.
2.2.4.3  Assessment
As stated in section 2.2.4.2 assessment is a triggered event based on an evaluation. An assessment
will often involve a numerical analysis where the purpose is to make a comparison between:
1. the calculated strength of the structure, or proof / overload
2. and the required performance criteria.
As it was discussed before, the start of the assessment process is triggered by the initiator event.
This  practically  means  that  some change  (e.g.  inspection  finding)  was  serious  enough,  and its
consequence is great or uncertain enough to need a detailed, documented, quantitative comparison.
The result of assessment can be that the platform is fit-for-purpose or risk reducing measures have
to be taken. The general process of assessment is presented in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Assessing fitness-for-purpose, based on /1/
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An assessment process is triggered if one or more of the following initiators happen:
• personnel added on the platform, hence the life-safety category changes
• there is an addition to the facilities on the platform which increases its consequence category
• if there is an increased loading on the structure. This can be environmental or operating. An
assessment is triggered in case there is a 10% increase in the loading
• inadequate deck height, and the platform was not designed for wave impact
• there  is  a  significant  damage  to  the  platform.  A single  or  combined  damage  is  to  be
considered significant if it reduces the structure's system capacity by at least 10%
• in case of increased cumulative loading and damage (if the combined effect is at least 10%)
In  Figure 2.5 it can be seen that there are 4 different assessment method categories that the API
RP2SIM distinguishes.
• Simple methods: using results from a previous analysis, comparison with similar platforms
• Design level method: it is a detailed analysis of the platform. Typically an elastic ULS or
ALS code check to meet the design criteria in the platform's as-is condition
• Ultimate strength method: in contrast with the design level method which is a component
check, this one focuses on the system capacity of the structure, hence it is often a non-linear
analysis
• Alternative methods: There are two basic types, the method of historical performance and
the explicit  probabilities of survival.  The first  one can be used if  the platform has been
exposed to a certain load without significant damage before,  and hence capacity can be
documented this way. The second is a probabilistic analysis, where it is important to justify
the probabilistic performance criteria to the deterministic assessment methods.
It is also clear from Figure 2.5 that API RP2SIM focuses on a ULS/ALS analysis when it refers to
assessment.
The ISO19902 depicts the assessment process a little bit differently (Figure 2.6), but in its main
concepts (focusing on capacity limit states) it is similar to API RP2SIM.
2.2.4.4  Strategy
The basis of strategy is the platform risk assessed with quantitative methods (Figure 2.3) or the
qualitative exposure category. The two methods really  make a difference when it  comes to  in-
service  routine  underwater  inspections.  The approaches  provided  are:  “a  risk-based underwater
survey (...) and an exposure-based underwater survey. When the owner/operator has not adopted a
risk-based SIM strategy, an exposure-based (default) inspection program should be used.” /1/.
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In general the API RP2SIM offers two options in connection with strategy:
• risk  control,  where  the  inspection  plan  should  define  the  scope,  frequency,  methods,
tools/techniques of the inspections
• risk mitigation, where the risk reduction methods are either improving on the consequence
or the likelihood side as described in section 2.2.4.2
The inspection plan defines when and how the inspections are carried out, but is less detailed, and is
not a work instruction as the inspection program (see section 2.2.4.5). The inspection plan is/should
be updated on a regular basis, based on the data stored and evaluated in the SIM system. There are
two topics in connection with inspection plans that the API RP2SIM discusses, which are the scope
of the inspections and the strategy in connection with the inspections.
Inspections should be carried out:
• regularly for the above water parts of the structure
• for the under water parts:
1. to assess as-installed condition a baseline inspection, so that it can become a basis of
later inspections and SIM evaluation. This baseline inspection will also become an input
to any risk based inspection program. The minimum scope of work for this inspection
should include:
a) “a visual survey of the platform for structural damage, from the mudline to top of
jacket, including coating integrity through the splash zone
b) a visual survey to verify the presence and condition of the anodes
c) a visual survey to confirm the presence and condition of installed appurtenances
d) measurement of the as-installed mean water surface elevation, with appropriate
correction for tide and sea state conditions
e) record the as-installed platform orientation
f) measurement of the as-installed platform level”
2. regular under water inspections (see Inspection strategy below)
• non scheduled inspections that are to be carried out after a storm or collision
In terms of a general and high level inspection strategy the API RP2SIM accepts two approaches:
• The structure is designed to be robust and high calculated fatigue lives are achieved in the
design process. This way it is possible to reduce operating costs with respect to inspections.
• The strategy is based on an early detection of damage or corrosion and prompt inexpensive
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repairs. This is applicable if the structure is deemed less robust, hence minor defects can
compromise to a great extent the system capacity.
Figure 2.6: Assessment process, based on /2/
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Within strategy, it is possible to talk about risk reduction that happens within the limits of the risk
evaluation regime. It is possible to use exposure mitigating measures that reduce the consequence of
failure. These measures include:
• improving life-safety category: making plans for evacuating personnel before the design
event, reducing permanently the number of personnel
• improving consequence category:
1. preventing hydrocarbon leakage by:
a) installing sub-surface safety valves
b) permanently or temporarily close down wells
c) reducing/removing the stored hydrocarbon amount
d) isolating pipelines
2. removing / re-routing major oil lines, gas flow lines
It is also possible to make improvements on the other side of the risk matrix, namely to reduce the
likelihood of structural failure by the following measures:
• removing damaged parts and components (member and crack removal)
• reducing loads (dead weights, marine growth removal, deck raising, taking shielding effects
into account)
• localized and global strengthening (member-, joint- and leg-pile grouting, additional braces
with clamps)
2.2.4.5  Program
The Program block in a SIM process represents the actual inspection scope, schedules, assigned
personnel, budget and prescription of methods. It may refer to any of the inspections mentioned in
the  Strategy  part  (baseline,  routine,  special,  etc.).  The  program  itself  is  developed  from  the
inspection strategy. 
2.3  SIM in NORSOK N-005 /3/ and NORSOK N-006 /4/
2.3.1  General
The foreword of NORSOK N001 states that NORSOK standards are usually based on international
standards. They are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry to “ensure adequate safety,
value adding and cost effectiveness for petroleum industry developments and operations” /3/. It is
the intention NORSOK standards to replace oil company specifications where possible.
In this section it is NORSOK N-005 /3/ and NORSOK N-006 /4/ which is being dealt with. Both of
them serve as a supplement to NORSOK N-001  /6/ which is the principle standard for offshore
structures.
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The purpose of NORSOK N-005 is to cover all aspects of integrity management for all types of
offshore  loadbearing  structures  “including  substructures,  topside  structures,  vessel  hulls,
foundations, mooring systems and marine systems such as water and weather tight systems, stability
systems and station keeping systems” /3/.
NORSOK N-006 details the general principles, guidelines and requirements that are needed for the
assessment  of  structural  integrity  of  offshore  structures  in-service  and before  life  extension.  In
addition to being a supplement to NORSOK N-001, the Scope section of NORSOK N-006 states
that N-006 “serves as an alternative of the N-001”  /4/ standard in case a structure, that is to be
assessed,  will  be operated beyond its  lifetime,  original  design requirements,  and it  is  difficulty
possible to document code compliance. In these cases N-006 provides methods to use information
gained during the life of the structure to demonstrate adequate strength.
NORSOK N-005 is used for the structural integrity management parts of this section, while N-006
is used for the assessment parts.
2.3.2  Using a draft edition of NORSOK N-005
At the  time  of  writing  this  thesis,  the  Rev  1  version  of  the  NORSOK N-005  /7/ is  the  valid
document. However, a new and updated version of NORSOK N-005 /3/ is being prepared, which is
used as source in this thesis. Unless noted otherwise, all references to NORSOK N-005 refer to /3/.
The used version of NORSOK N-005 is an unfinished, living document, hence later changes can be
expected, however it is expected that there will be no new draft revision before the completion of
this thesis.
The purpose of the update was to cover the whole integrity management process (plan,  survey,
assess, adjust) as well as to include marine systems in NORSOK N-005. This way NORSOK N-005
can provide a broad scope on  risks, hazards, preparation, response and performance of integrity
management. In addition it defines its scope as “principles, practices, functional requirements and
guidelines for the integrity management of structural and marine systems throughout their lifetime,
including decommissioning and final removal” /3/.
2.3.3  Description of integrity management in NORSOK N-005
It is worth noting in advance, that N-005 uses surveillance for what API RP2SIM /1/ and ISO19902
/2/ used inspection. It has to be noted however that in NORSOK N-005 surveillance is defined with
a  broader  meaning  than  the  physical  inspection  of  structures  only:  “The  in-service  activity
concerned  with  detecting  changes  to  the  design  regime,  configuration  and  design  actions  for
integrity assessments.”  /3, section 3.1.31/. I.e. documents can be a subject to surveillance. This is
also because data is input to evaluation and assessment and the data covered here is much more than
inspection data of the structure.
The N-005 has a complex picture on integrity management (see Figure 2.7). The four main blocks
of API RP2SIM that can be seen in Figure 2.2 can also be found in the “As-is surveillance” box, but
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the figure is very much extended from the one found in API RP2SIM or ISO19902.
In Figure 2.7:
• solid  lines  indicate  continuous  activities  (e.g.  the  cyclic  process  inside  the  “As-is
surveillance” box)
• dashed  lines  with  a  narrow  gap  ( )  indicate  improvement  and  quality  assurance
activities (starting from Integrity assessment,  getting input from Compensating measures
and providing input to Integrity management strategy)
• dashed  lines  with  a  wide  gap  ( )  indicate  Integrity  management  strategy
improvements (taking As-is surveillance as a starting point). This represents the intention of
continuous improvement.
Figure 2.7: Integrity management process, based on /3/
According to N-005, barrier management is part of the Integrity management strategy, and it is
defined as having strategies for protecting a facility against hazards, by means of barriers with a
specific  function  that  either  block  hazards  or  reduce  the  consequences  of  hazards.  Integrity
management  shall  incorporate  strategies  to  maintain  and  review  barriers,  monitor  barrier
performance and evaluate if barriers can serve their function, as well as it shall enable continuous
improvement  on barrier  strategy and elements.  In  addition  integrity  management  has  to  define
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performance requirement for operation so that it is in line with the barrier strategy.
N-005 defines managing integrity also as a systematic and cyclic change management process and
defines the role of the Operator as being responsible for registering and assessing the consequence
of  any  change  that  affect  safety  or  performance.  When  safety  assessment  is  made,  the  most
important factors to be taken into account are human life and health; environment; and economic
aspects as properties, operating interests. By using SIM, the Operator is able to document integrity,
fitness-for-purpose  and  compliance  with  relevant  national  and  international  regulations  of  the
structure  throughout  the  asset's  life.  It  provides  a  framework  for  implementing  all  integrity
management activities, defining surveillance parameters, initiate response to surveillance findings
and structural evaluations.
The SIM process has to ensure fitness-for-purpose even in situations when the source of change is
not structural but it is a change in working personnel, corporate structure or the ownership of the
assets.  It  is  important  that  the  knowledge  gained  through  the  integrity  management  can  be
transferred.
In the interpretation that NORSOK N-005 gives, integrity management systems:
• enable  understanding  the  possible  hazards  and  their  nature  to  structures,  as  well  as
protection against hazards
• help establishing integrity strategy and performance criteria with respect to operation of the
structures
• provide a basis for defining and executing surveillance tasks, monitor changes to structural
condition, weights, variable loads, operating modes, regulations, etc.
• provide a basis for assessment and analyses in response to significant changes, may this be
an emergency response, detailed assessment with structural analysis or a mitigation action in
the form of structural repair
• sets requirements for necessary competence
• makes it possible to revise the integrity management system itself if changes necessitate it
The NORSOK N-005 sets focus on the continuous improvement of the As-is surveillance (the cycle
with the thick dashed lines in  Figure 2.7). This means that SIM as a management system needs
evaluation and improvement.
2.3.4  Elements of integrity management in N-005
2.3.4.1  Data for integrity management
There are two dimensions of data that N-005 uses: data types and data sources. Surveillance covers
all of these types regardless of their point of origin (source).
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Type categories:
• Design regime (the technical control framework for the design, fabrication and installation
which includes regulations, standards, specifications, procedures)
• Configuration (describes the geometry, properties, dimensions, condition, weights).
• Variable actions (properties of and imposed loads from the physical environment and the
operating activity. Categories of this type can be operating, extreme and accidental)
Source categories:
• Project as-built data concerning new facilities, systems, components
• Project as-built data concerning modifications to existing facilities, systems, components
• Service life 'as-is' data concerning changes to as-built data
The N-005 recommends the use of data management systems where all the acquired information is
to be stored for the entire lifetime of the structure.
The data and information above is stored in document archives and information databases.  The
latter ones are suitable for managing large quantities of data, and are able to produce reports; it is
typically  an  electronic  system.  Document  archives  commonly  used  for  reports.  Information
databases  store  and process  information  on surveillance  programmes,  surveillance  results,  as-is
weight control, as-is change register and as-is analysis models.
2.3.4.2  Engineering evaluation
The  process  of  engineering  evaluation  is  that  the  engineer(s),  who  possesses  the  necessary
knowledge and competence to carry out this task, decides if, based on the available data (previously
gained or fresh),:
1) immediate  or  scheduled  compensating  measures  are  needed  (e.g.  production  shutdown,
evacuate personnel, temporary reinforcements)
2) assessments are needed to gain more information on the impact of detected changes
3) further inspections needed
4) the current inspection programmes are adequate and they are performed well
5) the current inspection programmes are not satisfactory or they are not executed properly; in
this case action is to be taken.
If it is not option 4) that is relevant for the given situation, it is part of engineering evaluation to
initiate action (from assessment to the completion of compensating measures).
The process of engineering evaluation is that data is processed through three “filters”, as shown in
Figure 2.8. In this case the filter means that if the severity of one finding, which can emerge during
surveillance or assessment, exceeds the threshold of the filter, is being processed further. Findings
that exceed the predefined threshold are called anomalies.
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Figure 2.8: Engineering evaluation
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The  first filter is  the predefined reporting criteria applied during the execution of inspection or
surveillance. This is to ensure that relevant data is reported. Typical anomalies (topics that require
reporting) include: corrosion, anodes, buckling, debris, damages (local or global), leakage, loosing,
marine  growth,  weld  defect,  etc.  Anomalies  that  pass  this  filter  are  in  the  anomaly  register
afterwards.
The second filter is the so called evaluation criteria which effectively covers the assessment triggers
and KPIs that trigger the revision of surveillance programmes. With other words, the evaluation
concludes that the “new information may significantly change the results of existing as-is assurance
analyses or framework surveillance programmes” /3/.
The  third filter is  the  expert  engineering  judgment.  The  anomalies  in  the  anomaly  assessment
register  are  given to  a  specialist  engineer  who makes an  assessment  and if  deemed necessary,
performs structural analysis. Based on the results of the assessment, expert judgment is made on the
necessity of compensating measures if the structure is not found fit-for-purpose.
For the structural integrity assessment, the N-005 defines the As-is analysis model portfolio. The
portfolio  identifies  which  analysis  types  are  relevant  for  demonstrating  integrity  according  to
NORSOK N-001 or N-006 requirements. The analysis types are:
• Storm,
• Vessel impact,
• Earthquake,
• Redundancy,
• Fatigue,
• and Inspection planning.
The structural analysis model changes, that are necessary due to different anomalies, are stored in a
model update log. It is possible that the updating process takes into account the different urgencies
assigned to model types.
The way expert engineers make assessment covers the following steps:
1. Anomalies are received in the assessment register or communicated as an emergency request
2. The need for immediate compensating measure is evaluated or assessed
3. Decide which analysis needs to be updated with the anomaly
4. Anomalies are included in the model update logs with assigned urgency status
5. Run analyses if immediate assessment is needed (high urgency)
6. Evaluate results, and if needed take compensating measure
Assessment triggers are changes that are serious enough to question the validity of as-is assurance
models.  The  NORSOK  N-006  /4/ in  section  4.2  lists  the  following  conditions  as  structural
assessment initiators: “
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a) changes from the original design or previous assessment basis, including:
1) modification to the facilities such that the magnitude or disposition of the permanent,
variable or environmental actions on a structure are more onerous,
2) more onerous environmental conditions and/or criteria,
3) more onerous component or foundation resistance data and/or criteria,
4) physical changes to the structure's design basis, e.g. excessive scour or subsidence, or
relocation of mobile offshore units to a new location,
5) inadequate deck height, such that waves associated with previous or new criteria will
impact the deck, and provided such action was not previously considered.
b) damage  or  deterioration  of  a  primary  structural  component  or  a  mechanical  component
which contributes to maintain the assumed load conditions of the structure. Minor damage
can  be  assessed  by  appropriate  local  analysis  without  performing  a  full  assessment.
However, cumulative effects of multiple damages shall be documented and included in a full
assessment, where appropriate;
c) exceeding of design service life, if either
1) the remaining fatigue life (including design fatigue factors)  is  less than the required
extended service life,
2) degradation of the structure beyond design allowances, or is likely to occur within the
required extended service life.”
It is possible to define a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) to standardize, control and ease
the decision on the number, severity and need for corrective actions. KPIs can be assigned to key
elements  of  the  surveillance  and assessment  processes.  In  the  case  of  surveillance,  these  KPIs
indicate:
• if adequate surveillance programmes to collect data exist
• what status the surveillance execution program has
• what status the evaluation of anomalies have
In the case of assessment, the KPIs indicate the need for numerical analysis update, hence the KPIs
question:
• if analysis models covering all relevant action scenarios exist
• what status the anomalies in the assessment register have (assessed or not)
• what status the as-is assurance analyses have (with respect to model updates and analysis
results)
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2.3.4.3  Surveillance programmes
The basic surveillance unit in NORSOK N-005 is the surveillance task. Surveillance programmes
are scheduled lists  of  surveillance tasks.  The purpose of  surveillance is  detect  any change that
influences the as-is integrity assessments
The surveillance strategy forms the basis for Risk Based Inspection (RBI) assessments, which in
turn results in the definition of the long-term framework surveillance.
The types of surveillance programmes that the N-005 lists are:
• Baseline:  The  purpose  is  to  establish  an  as-is  basis  for  change  management  later.  It  is
performed shortly after commissioning. In case of life extensions, it is possible to make a
baseline inspection at the start of the extended lifetime
• Framework: these are the inspections of the long-term integrity management surveillance
strategy (in the “As-is surveillance” box in Figure 2.7)
• Special: special inspection programmes are carried out before the update of the long-term
programmes. The incorporate inspections that will be part of the long-term program, but at
the moment are not
• Unplanned: this is to investigate damages resulting from unexpected or exceptional events.
With respect to surveillance tasks, the N-005 defines three dimensions that are not independent of
each other.
The  object of  inspection  or  surveillance:  either  documents  onshore  (as-built  documentation,
operational  use  and  design  regime  limitations),  or  the  physical  asset  offshore  (structures  or
environment).
The methods of surveillance are dependent on the inspection object:
• in  connection  with  documents,  N-005  lists  methods  as  document  control  or  archiving,
awareness of contents
• in case of inspecting the physical asset with respect to structures we can talk about visual
and  measurement  type  of  inspections.  Within  visual  inspections there  is  general  visual
inspection which is used to detect large anomalies and corrosion, and there is close visual
inspection for small anomalies and cracks. Within measurement type of inspections one can
find the different ultrasonic, electromagnetic, radioactive type of inspection methods
• if  it  is  the  physical  environment  that  is  subject  to  surveillance,  the  N-005  focuses  on
measurements  in  connection  with  fluid  dynamics  (waves,  wind,  current,  tides,  surge),
temperature, ice, snow and soil sampling.
The third dimension is the  surveillance scheduling, which is dependent on the risk that is to be
mitigated and the used inspection method (probability of detection).
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2.3.4.4  Surveillance execution
It is the surveillance campaigns that are the organizing structure for the surveillance tasks. They
typically  hold  together  tasks  (or  collection  of  tasks  called  work  packages)  that  are  scheduled
somewhat close in time. For a given task, there can be some schedule changes, but if postponed by
several years, than it is an execution anomaly and there has to be an engineering judgment on if this
is possible, or can be justified.
Campaigns can organize tasks according to execution place and methods. E.g. onshore document
surveillance and offshore physical surveillance.
There is a minimum of what defines the inspection task (surveillance task execution description):
• Campaign name and ID
• Work package name and ID
• Task ID
• Surveillance type (planned inspection type and deployment method)
• Location details
• Location drawings or plots
• Task description and special requirements
There are also defined data that a surveillance result has to contain:
• Inspection execution date
• Inspector name and company
• Inspection problems (yes/no)
• Description of any inspection problems
• Inspection type(s) and deployment method used
• Inspection findings (yes/no)
• Finding description and data
• Probable cause and possible consequence
• Corrective actions taken
• Recommended further action
• Reference to separate reports, images, videos.
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2.4  DNV GL SIMS: Software tool developed by DNV GL to support 
the SIM process
2.4.1  Introduction
The SIMS (Structure Integrity Management System) program is developed by DNV GL Software in
close cooperation with ConocoPhillips Norway. SIMS is a software implementation of the SIM
process as defined in NORSOK N-005 /3/, integrating all elements of change control. The primary
focus of the software is the Greater Ekofisk Area (GEA), but its versatile functionality enables it to
be used for any platform area. It provides an easy to use graphical interface and advanced database
techniques to support the following tasks in structural integrity management:
• Enables rapid data registration, collection and accessibility functions using a hierarchic data
model that ranges from the individual structural member (e.g. a particular beam), through
the organizing unit of a facility, up to the level of a field of platforms. The type of data can
vary from structural element properties (e.g. geometry, flooding, inspection findings, etc.),
to reports, documents or pictures.
• Has an  “as-is”  analysis  model  portfolio  management  including storing,  archiving,  status
registration, model change management. The finite element models are linked to the change
management.
• Helps quality assurance with the use of checklists.
• Supports surveying with the possibility of defining inspections and connected details in the
program; organizing inspections in work packages and campaigns; printing hard copies of
standardized  inspection  report  templates;  registering  findings  and  forwarding  them  to
evaluation.
• Facilitates  eventual  reporting  obligation  to  the  Petroleum Safety  Authority  (Codam),  by
automatic generation of required reports.
• Provides a traceable, hierarchic decision making processes by precisely defining roles and
responsibilities of those involved in either analysis tasks or evaluation of survey findings.
• Includes an important management tool, the KPI aggregation. KPIs can be defined on all
levels of data hierarchy for all stored data types. The low level KPIs can propagate to higher
levels,  enabling very high level  overviews, using the traffic light  analogy (green – OK,
yellow – issues, red – not OK).
• Helps  the  user  with  3D-viewer  models  that  have  information  and  status  views  on
inspections, anomalies, repair history, geometry and dimensions. The 3D viewer models are
in harmony with the analysis models.
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• Enables to share information between stakeholders through a common and secure access to
SIMS database in wide area network.
• Makes it possible and required that all data, reports, analyses are saved with a series of
attributes (meta-data) which enable searching and indexing.
• It  serves as a generic information tool which gives rapid access to key or often needed
information.
• It also has various report generating functions, so that communication with those who do not
have access to SIMS is eased.
The original concept that DNV GL's SIMS program is built upon takes its basis in the challenge
that:
• Offshore structures usually operate for decades in extremely hostile environments
• There is significant cost and serious consequences connected to the operation, accidents and
• Many of the existing structures have reached of the original design life, but is intended to be
operated in an extended time period (enhanced oil and gas recovery), DNV GL /8/, /9/
• Pressure on resources is relieved by the efficient data management system and control.
It is vital that structural integrity is efficiently managed to ensure continuous and safe operation.
This inevitably invokes a need for an effective change management, since it is the responsibility of
the  operator  to  capture,  evaluate  and,  if  necessary,  mitigate  design  premise  changes  which
inevitably occur during the lifetime of a structure, which HSE and PSA are placing increased focus
on. Examples of such changes are environmental effects (corrosion, fatigue, scour, marine growth,
subsidence,  wave  statistics  etc.)  and  operational  effects  (modifications,  weight  changes,  risk
classification, hazard scenarios etc.), but changes in regulations can also be expected. Emergency
preparedness  capabilities  are  dependent  on  long  term data  security,  data  storage  and  integrity
management that is independent of personnel or organizational changes.
2.4.2  Definition of SIM in DNV GL's SIMS
As the SIMS brochure states: Structure Integrity Management (SIM) is the process of ensuring that
the 'as-is' condition (corrosion, cracks, anodes, marine growth) and configuration (geometry, self
weights, topside layout) of structures are known (surveyed) and correctly simulated, and that the
results of hazard load analyses for foreseen design events (storm waves, earthquake, ship impact),
satisfy company acceptance criteria and regulatory requirements. (9).
In Figure 2.9, which is a reproduction from /8/, the purpose of structural integrity management is
shown as it is applied to DNV GL's SIMS program. It can be seen that the focus is on knowledge
and change management. Reliability is defined as the mathematical combination of capacity and
loading. From the introduction it is clear that the goal of DNV GL with the SIMS program is to
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focus on reliability and regulatory compliance over time. Hence diverging from installation as-is
condition  is  seen  the  biggest  threat.  This  includes  on  the  capacity  side  deterioration  effects,
structural modifications, etc. On the loading side it can also be configurational changes or increased
knowledge on hazard actions (e.g. ship impact curves).
It  can  be  seen  that  configuration  (structure  and  platform) appears  on  both  sides  (capacity  and
loading). The arrow on the capacity side points to the jacket, on the loading side to the topside. This
implies that the tracking of topside loading changes has increased focus on the right side.
Figure 2.9: The purpose of Structure Integrity Management, source /8/
The objective with Figure 2.10, which is also a reproduction from /8/, is to show that 'Inspection'
and  'Assessment'  activities  are  integrated  in  the  same  environment  (i.e.  the  SIMS  system).  It
preserves parts from the original concept of API RP2SIM  /1/, as Data – Evaluation – Strategy –
Execution/Program, but extends it with practical requirements.
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Figure 2.10: Definition of SIM process, source /8/
2.4.3  Analysis model portfolio
There is a certain tool in SIMS called the As-is Assurance analysis portfolio and Status Overview
matrix which:
1. defines the required types of analyses for each Major Structure Area
2. gives an overview of the model portfolio compliance (AAm, AAc, etc.)
In Figure 2.11 which is a reproduction from /8/ an example is shown of the status overview matrix.
It has to be emphasized that this is an example only and does not contain real information on the
model/analysis/regulatory compliance status of the different platforms.
The major structures are in the rows of the matrix, and necessary analyses are in the columns. For
each analysis there are two columns, one of this defining if the particular analysis is required for the
platform (AAm), the second showing the status of the analysis.
The statuses are color-coded in the two columns with the following legend.
In the required (AAm) column:
• White – has not been defined if the model is required
• Red - model is required but has not been stored in SIMS
• Green - model is required and can be found in SIMS
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• Grey - model is defined as not required
In the status column (AAc):
• Red - analysis in major non-compliance with design requirements
• Yellow - analysis in minor non-compliance with design requirements
• Green - analysis in compliance with design requirements
• Grey - no status exists or model does not exist
Figure 2.11: As-is assurance analysis portfolio and overview matrix, source /8/
NB! This figure does not contain real information on the status of the plaforms
In Figure 2.11 the first column is the facility code, the second is the area code within the facility.
The following Major Structure Areas can be defined: A (Topside), B (Bridge), C (MSS – module
support structure), F (Flare), G (GBS – gravity based structure), H (Helideck), J (Jacket Main), K
(Crane Pedestal), T (Jacket Bridge), W (Seabed Template/Wells), M (Module), X (Foundation).
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2.4.4  The structure of DNV GL's SIMS
SIMS has four portals: Survey, Analysis, Find and Ensure, which are denoted with the first letter in
lowercase (i.e. SIMS-s, SIMS-a, etc.) /8/.
Survey covers the functions of  Change detection. This can be either on-site condition surveys, or
weight-  and configuration surveys (monitoring SAP as-built  databases,  offshore layout  surveys,
offshore level and distance surveys, offshore free-board surveys and GPS subsidence monitoring).
Analysis covers the assessment of anomalies. First all anomalies, that are evaluated if they trigger
an assessment, are registered in the “Change register”. The changes are assessed and, if found to
have  a  “High/Medium”  impact,  transferred  to  the  analysis  model  “Change  logs”,  for  later  or
immediate implementation in the As-is Assurance Analyses.
Find functionality is the Document archive and Key Information tools. Main purpose is to store
Design and As-is Assurance documentation.
Ensure is the functionality to make sure that the Survey and Analysis activities are consistently and
correctly executed, (i.e. there is a follow-up of the findings of the surveys later in the analyses) and
that any major hazards detected are mitigated in a timely manner (i.e. there is a response given to
the detected changes to maintain regulatory compliance). This is achieved by the generation of KPI
summaries and “Annual Structure Integrity Status” (ASIS) reports based on KPI data stored in the
Survey and Analysis  portals  and in QC checklists (i.e.  there are warnings given, by the use of
aggregated KPIs, if follow-up or response measures are not taken).
2.4.4.1  SIMS Analysis Portal (SIMS-a)
The  main  purpose  of  the  analysis  portal  is  to  provide  an  interface  for  storing,  accessing  and
updating structural computer models. The actual analyses do not take place here (i.e. SIMS is not a
FEA or CAE software, but more a library)
Models and statuses connected to models
The models are stored as 'As-is' Assurance models (AAm) in designated AA folders (one folder for
each Major Structure Area of a facility). The AAm models contain everything that is needed to run
an analysis, i.e. input files for geometry, permanent loads, variable loads as well as run-scripts that
ensure that input files are read and executed in the intended order and with the intended interpreter
settings. The AAm status represents the model's compliance with the real as-is situation may it
contain a list  of pending changes from previous anomaly assessment  with respect  to geometry,
environmental  condition  or  regulatory  issues.  The  AAa status  of  the  AA model  represents  the
regulatory  compliance  of  the  model  in  connection with  the analysis  results.  The AAa status  is
manually set by the analysis responsible. The AAQC status of the model is also a manually set
value which is the quality check status of the model (also set by the analysis responsible). The
AASAS (Structure Analysis Summary) status of the model, on the other hand, is a generated status
from the data in the AASAS checklists.
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The highest level status connected to an AA model is the AAc status, which aggregates all the
mentioned statuses above.
The 3D viewer models have to represent the as-is condition of the facility with respect to member
geometry, as well as they have to match the analysis models when it comes to member and node
numbering.
Change management
SIMS is designed to both register and follow-up the mitigation of changes. Change can be physical
(e.g. damaged member) or environmental or a regulatory change compared to the design conditions.
When a change event (i.e. anomaly) is created the following data are registered:
• the details of the change (large amount of data including where the change has taken place,
who registered and approved it, and the description of the change)
• the source of the change (survey, analysis, operation, regulations, other)
• the type of change (e.g. anomaly, criteria / methodology, environment, model improvement,
modification, operation, weight & configuration)
• the category of change (i.e. the criticality: low – medium – high)
• the schedule of the change (already implemented / tentative )
• the supporting documentation of the change can be saved
• reference  can  be  made  to  affected  AA models,  which  triggers  the  recalculation  of  the
analysis portfolio and overview matrix.
The registered changes have to be implemented one-by-one for the linked AA models.
2.4.4.2  SIMS Survey Portal (SIMS-s)
The function of the Survey portal is to organize and register inspections and findings. There are a
number of inspections that the analyses prescribe for a given structure. In SIMS, the individual
inspections are organized into campaigns which can typically involve more than one facility. It is
common to put all inspections for a given year in one campaign. Within the campaigns, there are the
work packages that typically cover one area or zone of one structure.
The typical inspection work process is shown in Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12: Work process of inspections in SIMS, based on /9/
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SIMS enables Ad-hoc findings also, i.e. findings that do not come from an organized campaign.
After the findings from the inspections are registered, there is an evaluation phase where personnel
use (structural) engineering judgment to decide on the further proceedings in connection with the
finding, i.e. if further assessment is required. If it is deemed critical enough it is put into the change-
assessment register for expert assessment the same way as a change event.
2.4.4.3  SIMS Find Portal (SIMS-f)
The function of the Find portal in SIMS is to provide access to facility related documents, even if
the document has been attached to a sub-level of the facility. This way it provides a searchable
overview of  all  connected  documents.  Each document  is  to  be “tagged” with  a  defined set  of
categorized meta-data. The linked document does not have to be a physical file stored in SIMS. It
can also be just a reference to a document.
In connection with meta-data, it has to be noted that not only documents, but also facilities, areas,
campaigns, inspections have a good number of meta-data fields.
In addition the structure can be viewed with the 3D viewer and it can be seen what areas belong to
the facility (the possible choices were mentioned in connection with Figure 2.11).
The Find portal is the highest level managerial summary platform in SIMS to get an overview of the
statuses of the facilities including analyses and inspections.
2.4.4.4  SIMS Ensure Portal (SIMS-e)
The Ensure portal contains the CODAM tool, DB reports, KPI summaries, the various reports and
the Activity plan tool.
The  CODAM  tool  is  used  if  standardized  reports  have  to  be  issued  to  the  Petroleum  Safety
Authority Norway (PSA).
The DB reports tool is suited for making customer specific reports from the data stored in SIMS.
The KPI summaries tool is a very high level overview tool that sums the statuses within the facility.
In addition to summing it also has trending functions, i.e. it is possible to see if the sums got better
or worse in the course of the years.
The ASIS report “enable users to create As-is Structure Integrity Summary (ASIS) reports. These
are typically generated at  the end of each year and provide integrity performance overviews at
aggregated and detailed levels.” /9/.
The other report types that are available in SIMS-e are: ACT – Analysis Change Task Summary,
SCA – Structure Condition Anomaly Summary, DFIO – Design, Fabrication, Installation, Operation
Resumé, SAS – Structure Analysis Summary.
The Activity plan tool is a project management tool tailored for the needs of the SIMS software.
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2.4.5  Conclusion on DNV GL SIMS as a tool supporting the SIM process
The  SIMS  tool  developed  by  DNV GL fully  supports  the  SIM  process  in  harmony  with  the
requirements given in NORSOK N-005, API RP2SIM and ISO 19902. SIMS is a solution that
integrates  the  inspection  (surveillance)  and assessment  activities  in  the  same environment,  and
provides software functionalities for all the main building blocks of SIM. 
SIMS  puts  change  management  in  focus  and  incorporates  solutions  to  register,  evaluate  and
mitigate risk with the following SIM processes: Manage survey changes, Manage analysis changes,
Find information, Ensure integrity.
2.5  Conclusion on the interpretation of structural integrity 
management in API RP2SIM, ISO19902 and NORSOK N-005
From the three standards that were subject to study in the previous sections API RP2SIM and
ISO19902 are very similar in the definitions they use for Structural Integrity Management, while N-
005 has somewhat different formulations. On the other hand in essence and with respect to basic
processes of SIM they are quite alike.
All three standards are very general in their definitions, and the described principles could be used
anywhere for any structure, but the details of certain processes limit the actual usage to a specific
geographic area /1, section 1/.
The three standards are very similar in what they see as the fundamental building blocks of SIM. 
There are differences between the API/ISO and NORSOK standards. One, that is very obvious, is
that the API/ISO uses the word inspection, while NORSOK is using surveillance. In the API/ISO's
inspection only the physical inspection of assets is included and eventual regulatory changes or
other sources that require document inspection come into the process via other channels. In the
NORSOK standard the term surveillance deliberately incorporates activities where inspection is
targeted at documentation or the physical surrounding of the asset. The NORSOK standard intends
to emphasize with this that the Data block contains information not only from structural inspection.
Difference can also be found how the four basic blocks of SIM are named in the standards. API/ISO
is using  data – (engineering) evaluation – strategy – program while NORSOK is using  data –
engineering evaluation – surveillance programmes – surveillance execution.
If we look at the contents of strategy or surveillance programmes in connection with the inspection
of  the  physical  asset,  very  similar  inspection  programmes  can  be  found  (baseline,
framework/routine and special). However it is clear that in the API/ISO standards the qualitative
risk is more focused, and the strategy block includes measures that modify the platform connected
risk and consequence in qualitative terms. The NORSOK standard is more based on quantitative
assessment for developing an inspection program.
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It can be noticed that the NORSOK N-005 /3/ often contains or prescribes details of the scope of
data from the different sources. One has a feeling that the author(s) of NORSOK N-005 had a
practical implementation in mind while writing the standard, and they felt that it was important to
give guidance on that as well.
It can also be noted about the new N-005, that it is visible from Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.7, that N-
005 has a more complex picture of Structural Integrity Management and puts emphasis on, as well
as tries to regulate the processes outside the four main blocks of SIM. This is a rather important
difference, because it sets focus on evaluating and improving the process of SIM also. This is an
additional  loop that  can  only  be  found in  N-005.  The intention  with  this  is  to  outfit  the  core
processes with a barrier context based on PSA recommendations /11/.
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3  Barrier control
3.1  Introduction
Accidents can be very diverse. There can be a plethora of hazards and a series of accident scenarios.
“The event sequences that lead to unintentional harm appears to be very different, the consequences
range from trivial to catastrophic, and accidents occur in very different social and technological
setting”, SINTEF /12/. Barriers and its theoretical predecessors are used in the risk analysis and risk
management  regimes  of  socio-technical  systems  in  order  to  help  tackling  the  problems  and
diversities connected to accidents in a systematic way.
Barriers are intentionally planned functions to prevent,  control or mitigate the propagation of a
hazardous event from making harm or reach its full consequences. It is common to have a series of
barriers, each implementing a particular function, the serial sum of which is intended to cover all
the foreseeable failure scenarios connected to the hazard.
The API RP2SIM  /1/ and ISO19902  /2/ standards have almost no references to barriers.  In the
proposed version of the new NORSOK N-005 /3/ there is a parallel drawn between the Structural
Integrity  Management  and  “rational  method  of  managing  safety-critical  systems,  activities  and
elements  (barriers)”  /3,  section  1/.  The  ISO  17776:2000  /13/,  ISO  31000:2009  /14/ and  the
Principles of barrier management in the offshore industry from PSA /11/ are named as sources.
The purpose of Structural Integrity Management is to ensure a fit-for-purpose condition. Barriers
are included in  this  thesis,  because SIM has  to  ensure that  all  measures  are  taken to  maintain
structural safety at an acceptable level. “This may imply that also preventive mitigations to reduce
or control actions and hazards, limit the structures sensitivity to actions and hazards, and robustness
to tolerate damage shall be managed. In this context, this standard (NORSOK N-005) is based on
barrier  management  of  safety  critical  technical  systems  and  components,  organizations  and
operations (…). This includes the principles and strategies for establishing and maintaining barriers
so that their function is safeguarded throughout the life of a facility.” /3, section 4.4/
3.2  Development of the barrier concept
Using the expression barrier in its current meaning in connection with risk and safety originates
partly form Gibson's energy model /15/ which aimed at classifying sources of accidents and injury
based  on  the  forms  of  the  physical  energy  involved.  The  goal  of  the  energy  model  was  to
systematically list causes of accidents /12/. The origins of the barrier concept are also partly based
on Haddon's /16/ “barrier perspective and its implications for accident prevention. The basic idea is
that accidents occur when objects are effected by harmful energy in the absence of effective barriers
between energy source and the object” /12/. In Figure 3.1 the barrier concept is shown.
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Figure 3.1: Barrier applied in the energy model, based on /12/
The hazard (potential source of harm) itself is the energy exchange, i.e. the energy has a quality and
quantity  that  is  harmful  for  the  target  or  victim  (e.g.  humans,  environment  or  assets  can  be
damaged). DNV GL in its report to the Norwegian Shipowner Association /17/ names eight basic
forms of energy that can be sources of harm or hazards, if control is lost over these. The eight forms
of  energy  (Movement,  Chemical,  Radiation,  Electricity,  Gravity,  Temperature,  Biological  and
Pressure) are shown in Figure 3.2. The barrier stands between the hazard source and the victim. 
Figure 3.2: Eight basic forms of energy, based on /17/
Haddon's ten strategies are listed below, from /16/ which is the original article. The strategies are
also listed from Lundteigen's presentation /18/ which is a more modern formulation and highlights
the 3 classes of measures in the strategies. The term barrier itself has a rather physical meaning in
Haddon's list, but this meaning can be extended with a more abstract interpretation. The term barrier
can include a more functional view /12/ where the goal, task and function is the barrier. From this
point of view all the 10 strategies can be looked upon as barriers.
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Haddon's 10 strategies (original)  /16/  :
1. The first strategy is to prevent the marshalling of the form of energy in the first place 
2. The second strategy is to reduce the amount of energy marshalled 
3. The third strategy is to prevent the release of the energy 
4. The fourth strategy is to modify the rate of spatial distribution of release of the energy from
its source 
5. The  fifth  strategy  is  to  separate,  in  space  or  time,  the  energy  being  released  from the
susceptible structure, whether living or inanimate 
6. The very important sixth strategy uses not separation in time and space but separation by
interposition of a material 'barrier' 
7. The  seventh  strategy,  into  which  the  sixth  blends,  is  also  very  important  -  to  modify
appropriately the contact surface, subsurface, or basic structure, as in eliminating, rounding,
and softening corners, edges, and points with which people can, and therefore sooner or later
do, come in contact. 
8. The eighth strategy in reducing losses in people and property is to strengthen the structure,
living or nonliving, that might otherwise be damaged by the entry transfer. 
9. The ninth strategy in loss reduction applies to the damage not prevented by measures under
the  eight  preceding  -  to  move  rapidly  in  detection  and  evaluation  of  damage  that  has
occurred or is occurring, and to counter its continuation and extension. 
10.The tenth strategy encompasses all the measures between the emergency period following
the damaging energy exchange and the final stabilization of the process after appropriate
intermediate and long-term reparative and rehabilitative measures. 
Haddon's 10 strategies (reformulated)  /18/:
Reducing the hazard:
1. Prevent the (creation of) hazard or threat
2. Reduce the amount of hazard or threat
3. Prevent the release of hazard or threat
4. Modify the rate of release from its source
7. Modify the relevant properties of the hazard or threat
Build physical barriers:
5. Separate in time or space the released hazard or threat
6. Separate with physical means of physical protection
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Protect and rehabilitate victims:
8. Make the victim more resistant to the damage
9. Reduce the further development of damage (in time and amount)
10. Stabilize, repair, and rehabilitate from damage
Barriers are also the part of the “Swiss Cheese Model” of accident causation from Reason /19/. The
barrier  model  from Haddon can be used for smaller  and larger  systems as  well,  but  for larger
systems a layered defense mechanism (“defenses in depth”) is  better. This concept is  shown in
Figure 3.3 which is based on /20/. It is typical for these systems that accidents do not develop from
single, isolated failures. The successive protective layers are represented with slices of cheese, with
each layer having its weaknesses (holes). The development of a hazard is stopped if one layer fails
but the successive layer stops the propagation. On the other hand the hazard can develop into losses
if in one particular hazard scenario the weaknesses “align” and a hazard can be realized, the hazard
can  propagate  through  the  barriers.  In  the  Swiss  cheese  model  barriers  can  be  physical,
organizational, technical and human also. 
The weaknesses in each layer can be due to  active or  latent failures.  Active failures have a direct
influence on the accident and originate from the errors of humans, their unsafe actions or the errors
of technology. Latent failures, on the other hand, do not have direct influences or consequences for
the accident causation, but still they let accident scenarios to develop. These are unrevealed defects
or flaws in the system. It has to be noted in connection with Figure 3.3 that the layers of defenses
seem independent, but they are not. The connectedness and interdependency of layers (e.g. energy
supply) must be subject to analysis.
The weaknesses or “holes” are not necessarily constant but indeed can change with environment
factors, time/aging, and are dependent on influencing factors.
Figure 3.3: Swiss cheese model, based on /20/
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In summary it can be said about the development of the barrier concept that:
• in  its  early  forms  the  term  barrier  is  a  concrete,  physical  structure  or  a  physical
countermeasure, but later on, applying a more functional perspective, barrier becomes the
“tasks that are necessary to adequately control a specific hazard” /12/
• a development in the terms of consequences can be noticed also. While the focus is on the 
harm of the individual in the beginning, it shifts to the loss of control in large and complex 
systems later on.
3.3  Terms in connection with barriers
3.3.1  Definitions used by the Petroleum Safety Authority
This chapter presents the terminology used by the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) /11/ and Sklet
/21/, /22/ in connection with barriers and barrier management.
As the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) defines in the Summary section of Principles for barrier
management in the petroleum industry /11/ that barriers and barrier management serve the purpose
of reducing and managing risk so that:
• any undesirable event is prevented from happening, or
• the consequences of such an event are reduced or eliminated.
PSA defines  barriers as a very general term, as concepts. Barriers are “technical, operational and
organizational elements which are intended individually or collectively 
• to reduce possibility/ for a specific error, hazard or accident to occur, 
• or which limit its harm/disadvantages.” /11/. 
Barrier is the word to refer to the barrier function and barrier element with a one word term.
A  barrier function  is  the role  or the purpose that the barrier  implements.  This function can be
“preventing leaks or ignition, reducing fire loads, ensuring acceptable evacuation and preventing
hearing damage.” /11/.
It is the barrier elements that can have a physical meaning, it is the way or means of implementing
the barrier function. A barrier element can be any “technical, operational or organizational measures
or solutions which play a part in realizing a barrier function.” /11/.
The term  performance requirement or  performance standard is  in  very close connection to the
barrier element, since these define the verifiable qualities that the barrier elements must possess to
ensure  that  the  barrier  function  is  active  and  that  barriers  are  effective.  The  qualities  that
performance  standards  define  are  “capacity,  functionality,  effectiveness,  integrity,  reliability,
availability, ability to withstand loads, robustness, expertise and mobilization time.“ /11/.
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The performance influencing factors are the conditions which can have an effect on the character of
the  defined  qualities  from  the  performance  requirements.  These  are  factors  that  strengthen  or
weaken the ability of barrier functions and elements to perform as intended.
The term  barrier strategy is the answer to the risk picture. It  describes and clarifies the barrier
functions and elements to be implemented in order to reduce risk.
Figure 3.4, shows the structure and hierarchy of the terms above, used by PSA.
Figure 3.4: Structure of terms related to barriers, based on /11/
In Figure 3.5 the process of barrier establishment is shown. Developing barriers (strategy, planned
elements and their influencing factors) is a risk treatment.
The process starts with establishing the context of the risk analysis. The context includes all the
conditions that must be taken into account, and which form the boundary conditions of the analysis
and operation later on. Regulatory prescriptions, company strategies for the context. Also the design
of the facility the barriers are formed for have to be taken into account.
The role  of the subsequent  risk assessment  is  to  establish a  risk picture.  This  includes  that  all
hazards and their possible consequences have to be revealed. As an answer to the hazards, barrier
functions and barrier elements are defined. Afterwards the effectiveness of barriers can be estimated
with risk and safety analyses. The results have to be evaluated in a way, that besides the (numerical)
results of assessments, regulatory provisions or company rules are also taken into account. The
latter may override the results of an analysis.
In the  risk treatment  step  it  is  reviewed if  additional  measures,  beyond those indicated by the
quantitative analyses,  are needed. The findings of the previous steps are  detailed in the barrier
strategy and specific performance criteria are formulated.
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Figure 3.5: Establishing barriers in the design phase, based on /11/
The PSA also defines  barrier management in  /11/ as process of activities with the intention to
establish and maintain barriers. The goal of barrier management is to maintain the barrier functions.
In Figure 3.6 the process of barrier management is shown.
Barrier  management  takes  its  starting  point  in  the  initial  establishment  of  barrier  strategy  and
performance  standards  (Figure  3.5)  based  on  the  risk  picture.  This  basis  must  be  monitored,
reviewed  and  possibly  updated  during  the  execution  or  operational  phase.  Measurement  and
verification has to be carried out in order to be able to secure continuous improvement and to
achieve robust barriers throughout the whole life cycle.
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Figure 3.6: Barrier management, partly based on /11/
The proposed new version of NORSOK N-005  /3/ gives  a good summary about  what shall  be
included  in  a  barrier  management  system:  “Barrier  management  includes  having  strategies  for
protecting a facility against hazards. The means of protection in this context is by barriers with a
specific function (role and purpose) to hinder the realization of the hazard or significantly reduce
the consequence of this hazard. Further, the strategies shall include means of how to manage the use
of the barrier and how to maintain the barriers, so that the barriers' function is safeguarded and meet
the prescribed performance criteria throughout the life of a facility. The barrier management shall
consist of:
• A barrier strategy and performance requirements to these barriers.
• Operation of the facility in accordance with the barrier strategy, performance requirements
and  any  operational  limitations  indicated  in  in  the  barrier  strategy,  or  that  the  barrier
strategy is based on.
• Maintenance  of  the  barrier  elements  so  that  they  are  able  to  meet  the  performance
requirements and fulfil the role of the barrier function.
• Monitor barrier performance and evaluate the barriers.
• Continuous improvement.”
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3.3.2  Definitions used by Sklet
Sklet defines barriers in his PhD Thesis /21/ in a rather similar way to PSA's definition, as “Safety
barriers are defined as physical and/or non-physical means planned to prevent, control, or mitigate
undesired events or accidents. The means may range from a single technical unit or human actions,
to a complex socio-technical system” /21/. He also uses the definition that barriers are technical,
human, operational, or organizational factors that influence the accident sequences.
The PSA defined the main components of the barriers as barrier functions and barrier elements. In
contrast with this to a certain extent Sklet defines the barrier function and the barrier system with
the following meaning: “It is useful to distinguish between barrier functions and barrier systems.
Barrier functions describe the purpose of safety barriers or what the safety barriers shall do in order
to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. Barrier systems describe how a barrier
function  is  realized  or  executed.  If  the  barrier  system  is  functioning,  the  barrier  function  is
performed. If a barrier function is performed successfully, it should have a direct and significant
effect on the occurrence and/or consequences of an undesired event or accident” /21/. It can be seen
that  the meaning of  barrier  function is  entirely similar  to  PSA's definition.  On the other  hand,
barrier system appears to be similar to barrier element. In this thesis the use of barrier element is
preferred.
Sklet defines performance indicators for barriers as attributes to describe the performance of the
safety  barriers.  These  attributes  are  functionality/effectiveness;  reliability/availability;  response
time; robustness; triggering event or condition; and the resources needed to implement and maintain
the barrier function.
The functionality stands for how much the barrier can perform its functions in the conditions and
environment it is situated in. The reliability is the capability to perform when needed. The response
time is the time between occurrence of deviation and fully implementing the barrier functions. The
triggering event is what activates the barrier functions. The robustness is the resilience of the barrier
against loads.
These attributes cannot be applied to all kinds of barriers, and usually not all the attributes can be
applied at the same time.
3.3.2.1  Categories of barriers
The term barrier is rather broad. It incorporates physical and non-physical elements. This results in
that they can be categorized from various aspects.
Among the  function  of  barriers  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  between preventive,  controlling  or
mitigating. This depends on where the barrier is placed within the accident sequence.
The barrier elements (the implementation of the barrier) can be:
• active or  passive: passive barrier can be e.g. a dam, active an ventilator that prevents the
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build-up of explosives in a confined area
• physical/technical or  human/operational:  physical  barrier  elements  are  all  that  can  be
touched,  while  operational  barriers  are  “human  actions  or  responses  that  results  in  the
activation  of  a  physical  barrier,  thereby  enhancing  the  total  system reliability”,  IADC:
Drilling lexicon /23/
• permanent  or temporary: permanent barriers can typically be built physical barriers, while
temporary ones can be removed, hence cease the barrier function
• continuously functioning/on-line or activated/off-line: these categories are mostly within the
aforementioned  temporary  barrier  category.  Continuously  functioning  barriers  can  be
sensors that send data on a permanent basis,  while  activated barriers can be emergency
equipment.
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4  Robustness
4.1  Introduction
Robustness is desirable property in structures and systems. Even without a proper definition, the
term robustness  implies  an  association  with  strength,  endurance,  invulnerability, durability  and
hard-weariness.  Robustness  is  the  quality  that  defines  how  structures  behave  outside  their
operational envelope and it defines their potential to survive accidents.
In the following sections there will be examples on how robustness is defined in connection with
structures  and  how it  is  defined  in  other  disciplines.  It  will  be  shown what  methodologies  or
approaches exist to ensure robustness in quantitative and qualitative ways.
4.2  Definitions of robustness
In this  thesis,  the main focus is  on how robustness  is  defined from a structural  point  of  view.
However it  is  useful to look at  how other disciplines define this term, since all  the definitions
reflect an aspect of robustness. This is essential for the given discipline, but may be important from
a structural point of view also. The following sentences are cited from Baker /24/.
In software engineering:
The ability to react appropriately to abnormal circumstances (i.e. circumstances “outside of
specifications”). A system may be correct without being robust.(cited in  /24/ from Meyer  /
25/).
Product Development and QC:
The measure  of  the  capacity  of  a  production  process  to  remain  unaffected  by  small  but
deliberate variations of internal parameters, so as to provide an indication of the reliability
during normal use.
In connection with ecosystems:
The ability of a system to maintain function even with changes in internal structure or external
environment. (cited in /24/ from Callaway et al. /26/).
Control theory:
The degree to which a system is insensitive to effects that are not considered in the design.
(cited in /24/ from Slotine and Li /27/).
In statistics:
A robust statistical technique is insensitive against small deviations in the assumptions.
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Design optimization:
A robust solution in an optimization problem is one that has the best performance under its
worst case (max-min rule). (cited in /24/ from Kouvelis and Yu /28/).
It is common in the definitions above that they define robustness as a property that helps reducing
the consequences of changes or deviations  from ideal conditions; as well  as that  it  hinders  the
propagation  of  changes  and  deviations,  so  that  they  remain  localized  and  leave  the  system
unaffected to the greatest possible extent.
4.2.1  Structural definition of robustness
The definition of robustness is formulated somewhat differently in the various design codes. This
section gives an overview and comments on the definitions.
ISO19902 /2/
In section 3.46: “robustness: ability of a structure to withstand events with a reasonable
likelihood of occurring without being damaged to an extent disproportionate to the cause”
In section 7.9: “A structure shall incorporate robustness through consideration of the effects
of all hazards and their probabilities of occurrence, to ensure that consequent damage is not
disproportionate  to  the  cause.  Damage  from  an  event  with  a  reasonable  likelihood  of
occurrence shall not lead to complete loss of integrity of the structure. In such cases, the
structural integrity in the damaged state shall be sufficient to allow a process system close
down and a safe evacuation, see Clause 10. 
Robustness is achieved by either
a) designing the structure in such a way that any single load bearing component exposed to
hazard can become incapable of carrying its normal design actions without causing collapse
of the structure or any significant part of it, or
b) ensuring (by design or by protective measures) that no critical component exposed to
hazard can be made ineffective, or
c) a combination of a) and b), above.”
EN 1991-1-7:2006 /29/
In  section  1.5.14:  “robustness:  the  ability  of  a  structure  to  withstand  events  like  fire,
explosions, impact or the consequences of human error, without being damaged to an extent
disproportionate to the original cause.”
In section 3.2: ensuring that the structure has sufficient robustness by adopting one or more
of the following approaches:
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1) by designing certain components of the structure upon which stability depends as key
elements (...) to increase the likelihood of the structure's survival following an accidental
event.
2) designing structural members, and selecting materials, to have sufficient ductility capable
of absorbing significant strain energy without rupture.
3) incorporating sufficient redundancy in the structure to facilitate the transfer of actions to
alternative load paths following an accidental event.”
4.2.2  Conclusion on the definition of robustness from a structural point of view
In summary, it is possible to conclude that:
• robustness is a derived property of the structure that comes from the aggregated properties
of several structural members (in contrast with initial properties like yield strength), and it
incorporates the direct and indirect effects of several initial properties
• robustness is in connection with circumstances that were unaccounted for or is in connection
with know circumstances that were assumed to have very low probability
• the  definition  of  robustness  contains  a  meaning  that  structures  shall  withstand  extreme
events, and
• the definition of robustness has a meaning, that it is a property of the structure, that given an
initial damage, it prevents consequences from being unacceptable relative to the initiating
damage,  and  ensures  that  structures  do  not  suffer  a  disproportionate  collapse  (e.g.
progressive collapse)
4.2.3  Robustness expressed with the likelihood of failure
In  connection  with  the  definition  of  robustness,  it  is  worth  looking  at  how robustness  can  be
expressed with the means of probability calculations.
The  robustness  definition  is  very  well  represented  in  the  probability  of  disproportionate  or
progressive collapse in Ellingwood and Dusenberry /30/ referenced in Starossek and Haberland /31/
P(F)=P (F∣DH )∗P (D∣H)∗P(H ) Formula 4.1
Where, P(H) is the probability of an abnormal event (hazard) that threatens the structure; P(D|H) is
the probability of local damage D given the event H; and P(F|DH) denotes the probability of the
failure F of the structure given there is a local damage D, given there is a hazard H.
It has to be noted that  Formula 4.1 refers to one specific hazard, and one specific initial damage.
This  is  accounted  for  in  Formula  4.2,  which  is  the  modified  form of  Formula  4.1 taking  the
probability of failure from all hazards, all initial damages and all ways of progressive collapse.
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P(F)=∑
i
∑
j
∑
k
P(Fk∣D jH i)∗P (D j∣H i)∗P(H i) Formula 4.2
There  exist  many  different  or  overlapping  definitions  for  robustness.  Using  Formula  4.1 it  is
possible to give expressive examples on the differences.
Aven  /32/ defines vulnerability as the antonym of robustness: “Vulnerability: combination of the
consequences  and  associated  uncertainties  given  an  initiating  event”.  Hence  the  definition  of
vulnerability covers the following elements: (C, C∗ , U, P , K|A). In Aven's definition the meaning
of symbols is the following:
C consequences
C* prediction of C
U uncertainty
P probability
K the background knowledge K
given that the initiating event A takes place.
This is in harmony with how Starossek and Haberland /31/ define vulnerability, see Figure 4.1, but
is in contrast with their definition of robustness (not antonym). I.e. robustness in Figure 4.1 is only
the  last  part  of  the  combined  probability, the  chance  of  collapse,  given  the  hazard  and initial
damage.
Figure 4.1: Probability of disproportionate collapse, source /31/
4.2.4  Robustness expressed as a calculated property
Faber et al.  /33/ define the risk in connection with disproportionate collapse. They use a stepwise
methodology with the below stages to analyze consequences:
1. there is an exposure to a hazard of any kind (not necessarily explosion)
2. a local damage results from the hazard in step 1
3. the structure may or may not survive (be disproportionately damaged) resulting from the
initial damage.
Page: 55 of 75
Structural Integrity Management ensuring robustness and barriers
Istvan Szarka
This process is represented in Figure 4.2, which is reproduced from /33/.
Figure 4.2: Steps of consequence analysis, source /33/
Faber et al. in  /33/ states that robustness requirements are especially connected to step 2 and 3,
namely hazard control is less the part of robustness, but preventing initial damage and preventing
the propagation of initial damage is an essential part.
There are several approaches to quantify robustness, which can be classified in 3 categories:
• risk-based  robustness  index:  the  consequences  are  divided  into  direct  and  indirect
consequences (i.e. initial damage and damage from the propagation)
• probabilistic robustness index
• deterministic robustness indexes (based on structural properties, pushover analyses)
The event tree in Figure 4.3 uses the same principles as Figure 4.2: one of the possible hazards (H)
results in a situation where there either is or is not an initial damage (D or  D) at a specific place
(therefore many possibilities at the “D junction”). If there was an initial damage, the structure may
or may not fail (F or F). This latter two paths result in direct or direct + indirect consequences. This
means  that  the  given  direct  and  indirect  consequence(s)  belong  to  a  failure  scenario.  Direct
consequences are considered as the direct  result  of the hazard exposure and, depending on the
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intensity  of  the  exposure,  may  correspond  to  damage  to  one  or  more  individual  components.
Indirect  consequences in  principle  comprise  all  consequences  in  addition  to  the  direct
consequences.
Figure 4.3: Event tree for quantifying robustness, source /33/
Formula 4.3 is the basis for risk analysis /33/:
R=∑
i
∑
j
Cdir ,ij P(D j∣H i)P(H i)+∑
k
∑
i
∑
j
C ind ,ijk P(Fk∣D jH i)P (D j∣H i)P(H i) Formula 4.3
In many ways, it is very similar to Formula 4.1, the additions are the following:
Cdir,ij direct consequence of hazard i and initial damage j
Cind,ijk indirect consequence of failure k, hazard i and initial damage j
P(Fk|DjHi) probability of failure k, given hazard i and initial damage j
P(Dj|Hi) probability of initial damage j, given hazard i
P(Hi) probability of hazard i
4.2.4.1  Creating indexes for robustness
Indexes  for  robustness  (non-dimensional)  are  useful  to  compare  different  solutions  and enable
decisions based on these.
Risk based robustness index
The risk based robustness index is proposed by Baker et al. in /24/ uses the same division of direct
and indirect consequences as above. The index of robustness is defined in Formula 4.4.
I rob=
Rdir
Rdir+R ind
Formula 4.4
Rdir and Rind are the direct and indirect risks.
The index takes values between zero and one, with larger values indicating larger robustness. It is
best used as an indicator to compare direct and indirect risk (i.e. propagation property), because
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considered that the goal is to minimize both direct and indirect risks, Irob can have values very close
to 1.0 with relatively large direct and small indirect risks
Reliability based robustness index
The following indexes are based on the works of Frangopol and Curley /34/ and Fu and Frangopol /
35/. The first one being the redundancy index (IR) in Formula 4.5.
RI=
P f (damaged)−P f (intact )
P f (intact )
Formula 4.5
Pf(damaged) and Pf(intact) are probability of failure for a damaged and intact system. The values of RI can
be between 0 and ∞, the smaller values meaning more robustness (i.e. Pf(damaged) is not much higher
than Pf(intact))
The second in Formula 4.6 is the redundancy factor (βR). 
βR=
βintact
βintact−βdamaged
Formula 4.6
In Formula 4.6 βintact and βdamaged are the reliability indexes of the intact and damaged system. The
value of βR changes between 1 and ∞, following the higher the more robust rule.
β as a reliability index is defined in  Formula 4.7 where  Φ is the cumulative normal distribution
function and P(F) is the failure probability, Cavaco et al.  /36/.
β=Φ(1−P(F ))−1 Formula 4.7
Deterministic robustness indexes
Within the category of deterministic robustness indexes it is possible to distinguish between those
that take a basis in a non-linear structural analysis and those that utilize linear methods. The first
group contains the
• reserve strength ratio and the damaged reserve strength ratio (1)
The second group incorporates the
• stiffness based robustness indexes and the (2, 3)
• Eigen value based robustness indexes (3, 4)
1) The reserve strength ratio (RSR) proposed by Faber et al. in /24/ is defined in Formula 4.8.
RSR=
Rc
Sc
Formula 4.8
Where Rc and Sc are the base shear capacity and design value in ULS, the Rc value coming from a
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pushover analysis. RSR can take values between 1 and ∞, where the bigger number denotes more
unaccounted capacity.
To specify better the effect of losing one particular member (I) the RIF value  (damaged strength
ratio) is defined in Formula 4.9.
RIFi=
RSR fail ,i
RSRintact
Formula 4.9
Where RSRfail,i is the RSR value of the platform given that member  i has failed. The RIF takes
values between 0 and 1, with larger values indicating larger redundancy.
2)  Robustness  can  be  measured  by  using  the  determinant  of  the  static  stiffness  matrix  of  the
structural system /31/.
RS=min
det K j
det K0
Formula 4.10
In Formula 4.10 Rs is the stiffness based robustness measure, K0 is the stiffness matrix of the intact
structure,  Kj is  the  stiffness  matrix  of  the  structure  with  the  given  member(s)  removed.  This
expression needs further normalization in order for it to give a value between 0 and 1, as written in
Haberland  /37/.
3) Robustness can also be measured using the methodology proposed by Olmati et al. /38/ using the
Eigen values of the static stiffness matrix.
There is a set of damage scenarios assumed, where the damage is represented with a consequence
factor  (Cfscenario in  Formula 4.11).  The damage scenario is  defined as the loss of one or several
members. Robustness is expressed as the complement of Cfscenario. (Formula 4.12)
Cmax
scenario=max(
λf
un−λ f
dam
λ f
un 100)
f=1. . N
Formula 4.11
Rscenario=100−Cmax
scenario Formula 4.12
The consequence factor and the robustness are expressed in %. The higher percentage of C means
higher consequences and less robustness in the given failure scenario.
In the above formulas λfun and λfdam are the Eigen value number  f of the stiffness matrix in the
structure's intact and damaged condition.
This method has certain limitations:
• not fit for structures that have high concentrated masses (especially non-structural masses)
in a particular zone, because the method does not take into account dynamics and masses
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• not fit for structures that have cable structural system (e.g., tensile structures, suspension
bridges),  because of the geometrical  non-linearity of cable structures.  In these cases the
stiffness matrix is a function of the loads (stress stiffening), something not accounted for in
the elastic stiffness matrix, as well as other effects (e.g. catenary actions) cannot be taken
into account this way.
4) A method based on 3) by Olmati is proposed with the following additions:
• the formulas used (Formula 4.11 and Formula 4.12) are kept with no changes, but λfun and
λfdam are the undamped free vibration Eigen value number f of the structural system gained
from Formula 4.13 to Formula 4.19.
[M ]{x¨}+[K ]{x}=0 Formula 4.13
{x }={X }eiω t Formula 4.14
[−ω2[M ]+[K ] ]{X }eiω t=0 Formula 4.15
[[K ]−ω2[M ]]{X }=0 Formula 4.16
[M ]−1[K ]=[A ] Formula 4.17
λ=ω2 Formula 4.18
[[A ]−λ [I ]]{X }=0 Formula 4.19
This method has the benefits  of 3) but improves on the dynamic properties, since it  takes into
account the mass matrix, hence it is more fit for structures with concentrated masses. On the other
hand it does not improve on the properties of the method in connection with structures that utilize
cable systems. Stress stiffening can be accounted for in the free vibration analysis, but the results
will be unreliable for highly non-linear structures.
A practical  example,  using  this  method  has  been  created  and  documented  in  Appendix  B,  a
summary of the results is included in section 4.4.
4.3  Using barriers for ensuring robustness
Ersdal in /39/ is using the barrier method to establish criteria for a robust design. The concept of the
methodology is shown in Figure 4.4, which is a reproduction from Ersdal /40/. Structures have their
operational envelope. This is the area of normal operation, and corresponds to where the design
value of loads does not exceed the value that belongs to the annual probability of 10-2. There are
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several reasons why the circumstances can be such that the structure steps out from its operational
envelope. These can be extreme loads, accumulated deterioration effects, accidental situations. If
the structure survives in these situations depends on how well the barriers are functioning.
Ersdal names 6 barriers that build up the robustness of a structural system which are denoted as the
principles  of  safe  design.  These  6  principles  are  based  on  various  standards  (ISO  2394:1998,
ISO/DIS 2394:2013, ISO 19900, EN 1990). The principles are the following:”
1. Knowing and controlling the hazardous events and actions
2. Limiting the structure's sensitivity to the hazardous events and actions
3. Ensuring that the structural elements are able to withstand the stresses from the hazards they
are exposed to
4. Ensuring that a single structural element failure is visible or detectable prior to a complete
collapse of the structure
5. Ensuring that the structure has the necessary damage tolerance
6. Reduction of the consequences of a collapse of the structure
Figure 4.4: Operational envelope and barriers, based on /40/
The 6 principles or barriers of robustness are represented in Figure 4.5 
Similarly to Aven, Ersdal defines robustness as the antonym of vulnerability, and assigns a broader
context  to  robustness,  expanding  the  meaning  from  “limiting  consequences  or  stopping
consequences from propagation” to including the avoidance of initial damage.
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The definition that Ersdal gives in  /39/ covers the whole equation of  Formula 4.1, since Ersdal's
barriers have influence on 
• the probability of the hazard
• the initial damage given the hazard and
• the probability of failure/consequence given the initial damage
This way, Ersdal is able to incorporate the entire domain of design, maintenance and emergency
preparedness. 
Figure 4.5: Six principles of safe design, source /39/
4.3.1  Application of barrier method
In this section, the focus is on the example of an offshore jacket structure. In this section I will bring
examples on the barriers of Figure 4.5 in connection with these type of structures. It is not the goal
of the thesis to provide a complete reference, but to show examples on typical structural related
topics. The examples are excluding fire and explosion which are quite extensive topics on their own
and are dealt with throughly in other works and within other disciplines.
4.3.1.1  Hazard: boat collision / iceberg collision
1) Hazardous event control: it is possible to monitor supply boats, other ships and icebergs,
as well as use e.g. GPS based systems on ships; and apply alarms if the ship is on a collision
course. This way possible to reduce P(H)
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2) Limiting sensitivity to hazard: The sensitivity to this kind of hazard can be reduced by the
use of non-structural members in a sense that these do not contribute to the integrity of the
platform, but  have  enough energy absorbing capabilities.  This  way they can reduce the
kinetic energy of the collision object by large deformation. This measure reduces P(D|H).
3) Load resistance: Structural members have to be designed for the proper accidental action
(e.g. DNV-RP-C204 /41/), so that they suffer no damage from these actions with the defined
annual return period. This measure also reduces P(D|H)
4) Visible detectable damage: The design has to be careful with creating connections that are
stronger than the members, this way the damage appears at places that are easier to inspect.
This measure reduces P(F|DH).
5) Damage tolerance: On the side of steel material properties and element design, adequate
ductility has to be provided so that the suffered damage does not cause brittle failure. This
way either a limited member capacity can be maintained, or the dynamic effect of load
redistribution can be decreased. The provided ductility may make it possible for the element
to carry loads in a different way than previously (e.g. catenary action after the formation of
plastic hinges).
On  the  side  of  structural  system design,  it  has  to  be  made  possible  that  loads  can  be
redistributed and alternative load-paths can be found. These measures reduce P(F|DH)
6) Reducing consequences: Make it possible to launch lifeboats in damaged / tilted condition.
This measure also reduces P(F|DH).
4.3.1.2  Hazard: Extreme wave / Topside overload
1) Hazardous event control: With respect to topside weight, it is possible to have a change
management system (e.g a SIM system), this way keeping track of changes and applying
assessment if the appropriate assessment triggers are activated.
The  annual  probabilities  of  extreme  waves  are  based  on  statistics.  Regular  update  of
statistical data can reveal a design that will under-perform in this design scenario.
2) Limiting sensitivity to hazard: It can be a design approach of topside structures to limit the
eventual P-Δ effects occurring in a scenario with sideways extreme loading.
The provision of adequate air-gap prevents the wave-loading of the deck (larger exposed
area with higher solidity than for the jacket).
Reducing the number of conductors limits the forces the structure is exposed to.
Similar is the effect with the removal of marine growth (i.e. force reduction).
A non-structural but effective counter sensitivity measure can be to limit where personnel
can be during storm.
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3) Load resistance: Appropriate ULS/ALS design of the structure.
4) Visible detectable damage: as in 4.3.1.1
5) Damage tolerance: as in 4.3.1.1
6) Reducing  consequences:  Evacuate  personnel  before  storm,  make  it  possible  to  launch
lifeboats in damaged / tilted condition.
4.3.1.3  Hazard: Fatigue / Corrosion
1) Hazardous  event  control:  this  type  of  hazard  can  be  controlled  by  inspections,  which
reduce the possibility of undetected degradation. When it comes to corrosion, the application
of consumables of cathodic protection can be a solution.
2) Limiting sensitivity to hazard:  the proper design solutions can result in more favorable
SN-curves and reduced hot-spot stresses.
3) Load resistance: appropriate FLS design of the structure, quality check of fabrication. It is
an  experience  that  fatigue  calculations  are  very  conservative,  but  fabrication  defects
dramatically reduce fatigue life at unexpected locations.
4) Visible  detectable  damage:  design  solutions  can  ensure  that  fatigue  cracks  appear  on
detectable sides of the welds
5) Damage tolerance: a possibility to limit the sensitivity for fatigue and corrosion is applying
design solutions with redundancy, i.e. the loss of one member does not lead to the collapse
of the structure. E.g. bracing types can contribute to such behavior
6) Reducing consequences: as in 4.3.1.1
4.4  Summary of member consequence calculation
In Appendix B an example calculation is performed using the method 4) among the deterministic
robustness indexes in section 4.2.4.1. The results and conclusions are summarized in this section.
The main formula used is Formula 4.20. Where λfun and λfdam are the undamped free vibration Eigen
value number f of the structural system.
Cmax
scenario=max(
λf
un−λ f
dam
λ f
un 100)
f=1. . N
Formula 4.20
It has to be noted about this method that it does not provide a global robustness index or factor as
the RSR value for an intact structure. This method is more focused on member importance, or the
consequence of losing a particular member or members.
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There has been a bridge structure (Figure 4.6) used to test the methodology. Several members were
removed from the structure (only one at a time) in an attempt to assess the consequence index that
belongs to the individual members. In Table 4.1 a summary of the results is provided.
Table 4.1: Summary of results using proposed methodology
Member Consequence (Cf) Critical Eigen mode
01 – Lower chord at support 40% 3
02 – Upper chord at support 33% 11
03 – Main diagonal (vertical) at support 26% 11
04 – Lower diagonal (horizontal) at support 33% 11
05 – Upper diagonal (horizontal) at support 34% 11
06 – Column above support 35% 11
07 – Lower chord at mid-span 49% 1
The results  show that  many members  have  their  most  critical  Eigen mode as  no.  11.  and the
consequence is very often close to 30-35% with quite small variation. This is somewhat unexpected.
Figure 4.6: Test bridge with members selected for consequence evaluation
Group of chord members: It is member 01, 02 and 07 that belong to this group. Member 01 and 07
have the highest consequence among all the investigated members in Table 4.1. From beam theory
it is susceptible that member 07 should have a high consequence, but it is unlikely that member 01
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has a consequence that is very close to member 07. It is even more unlikely that member 02 has a
lower consequence than member 01. The reason for this is: if the elevation view is looked at and we
imagine removing member 01, there is still a stiff, supported triangle transferring vertical forces to
the top of the column, on the other hand if member 02 is removed the stiff triangle at the support
becomes a bit “mechanism-like” in its connection to the main vertical girder of the bridge.
Diagonals: It is worth noting that vertical diagonal has a lower consequence than the horizontals, as
well as that there is no significant difference between the lower and upper diagonal. This latter
seems unlikely because the loads will have to be transferred anyways to the supports at the lower
points, so losing the lower horizontal diagonal is probably of higher consequence.
Arguments in favor of the method (pros):
• Easy to perform the analysis
• Can be performed in the vast majority of structural FEM software
• Low on computational resources
Arguments against the method (cons):
• the results  seem to contradict  the engineering gut  feeling  about  the  consequence of  the
members
• the results are not load specific: many structures are specifically designed for loads from a
certain direction that is usually dimensioning (e.g. beam bridge for vertical loads)
In summary, it can be said that the methodology failed to deliver to the expectations.
A  closer  look  however  to  the  results  revealed  some  correlation  between  a  slightly  modified
consequence index and an assumable real consequence.
It is mentioned above among the cons of the methodology that it is not load specific, more closely,
not specific to the direction of the load. The methodology has been modified in a way that the
consequence factor is not generated from the maximum deviation from all the considered Eigen
values,  but it  is  taken using only the Eigen mode the modeshape of which resembles most the
assumed deflection curve of the structure for the given load.
The structural  model  has  been modified in  a  way that  a loadcase with vertical  loads  has  been
created. In connection with this the second Eigen mode has been selected. The structure has been
code-checked using Eurocode 3  /42/ rules in intact condition and after individually removing the
selected members shown in Figure 4.6. The loads on the intact structure were scaled in a way that
the highest code-check result is 0.8 in the structure.
From the gained code-check results two indexes were taken: the gained maximum code-check result
or  utilization factor  (Ufmax)  from the whole structure;  and the biggest  change in  utilization  (Δ)
among all the members. The first index (Ufmax) is used to assess how big the consequence was from
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removing a member, the second (Δ) can give a hint about how extensive was the force redistribution
in the structure. The results are summarized in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Summary of code-check results
Intact
Model
Removed member
01 02 03 04 05 06 07
UFmax UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ
0.80 0.80 0.05 1.69 1.60 1.44 1.25 0.80 0.05 0.80 0.01 1.56 1.40 2.16 1.39
In Figure 4.7:
• UF is the utilization factor (Ufmax) from Table 4.2, the values are scaled
• Δ from Table 4.2, the values are scaled
• C-1 is the consequence according to Formula 4.20, with the modification that is is not the
maximum difference chosen from all the Eigen values, but it is the difference in Eigen value
no.1. The first Eigen mode is a horizontal bending mode (Figure 2.6).
• C-2, similar to C-1, but it is Eigen mode no.2 from which the Eigen values are taken. This
mode is a vertical bending and the shape resembles very much to the expected deformation
plot from gravity or vertical live loads (negative).
• C-max is the consequence according to Formula 4.20, the results are from Table 4.1.
Figure 4.7: Result summary of the modified methodology
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The Figure 4.7 was created to highlight the correlation between UF and C-2, and also between Δ
and C-2. There is a strong positive correlation for all members (except 07) between UF and C-2.
The correlation is even stronger between Δ and C-2.
It is also worth looking at the line of C-1 which belongs to the first horizontal bending mode. There
seems to be a negative correlation with UF at member 04 and 05. It seems reasonable that the
consequence of horizontal braces (04, 05) is higher in a mode with horizontal bending. The results
also match the gut-feeling that member 04 should have higher consequence (lower brace).
Compared to the original methodology (method 4) among the deterministic indexes in 4.2.4.1), it is
an improvement that there seems to be a way to become more load specific, or directional.
In spite of the visible correlation in the modified methodology, there should be done many tests and
analyses to be able to verify and prove, or contradict the method's reliability, furthermore:
1) Consequence values should be compared to push-over analysis results, with non-linearities
taken into account
2) It  should  be  investigated  how  results  are  affected  by  structures  that  include  high
concentrated masses.
3) It should be looked at how the involved mass in each Eigen mode is in connection with the
results – e.g. consequence index can have more or less relevance if participating mass is
high or low, totally or in a given direction.
4) It should be investigated if the consequence index in  Formula 4.20 can reveal something
about the structure in connection with loads that were not accounted for.
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5  Discussion and summary
Structural Integrity Management has been brought to life by need to be able to document adequate
likelihood of structural integrity of critical structures. These structures are typically of high value,
operated in  an environment  which are known to be damaging,  are  exposed to  corrosion.  Their
failure can be catastrophic for the society and the environment, and it may have significant financial
impact. The above factors were known and accounted for in the design phase for a given design life.
With new technologies emerging in hydrocarbon recovery, there appeared a need to operate these
structures longer as well as to modify them to suit the changed needs. Also the loss of knowledge
about the facilities could be experienced because of leaving personnel and companies going out of
business. This resulted in a growing uncertainty if fit-for-purpose condition can be maintained.
It was an objective of this thesis to find out if Structural Integrity Management, as it is described in
API RP2SIM  /1/, ISO19902  /2/ and NORSOK N-005  /3/, can provide a system that ensures the
maintenance of structural safety. 
All three standards specify a framework that elaborately defines what is to be done by the facility
operators to have reliable assets, to be aware of the shortcomings in their facilities and to mitigate
the risk connected. All three define SIM as a cyclic process, and have rather similar understanding
of the four elements of the cycle: data, evaluation, inspection plan, inspection execution.
The SIM system is tailored for managing change, because it integrates storing information about the
change, it initiates its evaluation and it takes a proactive approach in finding changes (inspections).
This is the main priority in ensuring a fit-for-purpose condition. All three standards take the baseline
inspection as the starting point and continuously store, process and initiate reaction to changes, so
that the emerging risk is mitigated. On the other hand it can be noted that there are additional things
that could have more focus in a SIM framework:
• If Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 is looked at in the section of Barrier concept, it can be seen that
the establishment of barriers is part of a bigger picture. The outer loop is responsible for
ensuring that barriers are kept up-to-date. A similar “improvement loop” for SIM has almost
no focus in API RP2SIM. An established SIM system, as all systems, degrade with time. It
would be important to emphasize, as it is included in NORSOK N-005 (Figure 2.7), that the
processes,  formed  by  the  four  main  blocks  of  SIM,  need  continuous  re-evaluation  and
improvement.
• SIM processes are very much based on engineering evaluation. Engineering decisions are
made  in  every  cycle  on  the  impact,  criticality  or  uncertainty  of  a  finding  or  change.
Additionally,  the  assessment  parts  require  extensive  engineering  skills.  Ensuring  that
engineers involved in the SIM process are adequately knowledgeable on structures, as well
as  they  are  aware  of  the  differences  between design  and assessment  engineering,  is  an
important factor in effective structural integrity management. There is limited requirement
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in  SIM standards  in  connection  with  this.  Ensured  skills  could  be  connected  to  formal
requirements, years of experience or other qualities.
It was also the objective of this thesis to explore what role DNV GL's SIMS software has in the
process of integrity management of structures.
The SIMS software product is developed by DNV GL Software. It is a supporting tool for the SIM
process. Its purpose is to provide and aid for executing the four main SIM principles. It is a solution
that  presents  a  background  for  inspection  and  assessment  activities  in  the  same  environment.
Numerical assessments are carried out in programs outside of SIMS. This is true for the actual
generation of inspection intervals/programs also. The results of analyses are registered in SIMS
through the use of analysis statuses, and the prescribed inspections find their way into the system
through the creation of work packages and campaigns. The SIMS system is very good at showing
high level summaries, but also the hierarchic breakdown of structures and facilities is very elaborate
and detailed. The SIMS system fully supports all intended activities, as well as it features additional
elements that ease the activities (e.g. 3D viewer).
A third objective was to evaluate  if  barriers  are part  of the SIM process and if  SIM standards
recognize this or not.
There is almost nothing about barriers in the API RP2SIM /1/ and in ISO19902 /2/, but the proposed
new version of NORSOK N-005  /3/ has more focus on barriers. The beginning of N-005 states
“These provisions of this standard are based on the rational method of managing safety-critical
systems,  activities  and elements  (barriers),  (…).  This  includes  the  principles  and strategies  for
establishing and maintaining barriers so that their function is safeguarded throughout the life of a
facility.” /3, section 1/. 
Barriers are a part of SIM because, as the N-005 states, “the objective of integrity management of
structures  and  marine  systems  is  to  ensure  and  document  an  acceptable  level  of  safety  and
suitability for their intended purpose in all phases of their life” /3, section 4.1/. I.e. both suitability
and  safety  of  the  structures  have  to  be  ensured.  Barriers  are  the  means  to  ensure  safety  for
personnel, environment and assets. The barrier methodology is very suitable for identifying hazards
and control  strategies  for  hazards.  It  enables  analytical  risk control.  Its  application builds  up a
defense in depth safety ensuring structure.
The fourth objective concerned the connection between robustness and SIMS. 
As it was shown in section  4, there can be given many definitions for robustness ranging from a
purely structural to a system concept. Most of the system concept definitions agree on that a system
can function well without being robust, and robustness is a property that comes to the foreground in
the event of the extreme, when the situation is outside the operational envelope. Robustness is about
surviving the unforeseen.  Robustness with a  focus  on structural  properties  tries to  measure the
unaccounted  capacity,  the  risk  connected  to  a  collapse,  the  reliability  of  the  structure.  Other
structural robustness indexes often express the consequence of losing one member.
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The  system view concepts  of  robustness  have  the  advantage  over  purely  structural  robustness
definitions that the protection of humans, environment and assets is not just an indirect outcome of
structural survival. It is robustness defined with the barrier method that gives the most complete
picture, in this respect, from a structural safety point of view. It is the robustness achieved through
the layered defense mechanism that is the most suitable to mitigate risk arising from a multitude of
hazard  sources  in  a  number  of  accident  scenarios,  and  which  can  accommodate  the  various
consequence reduction methods. If robustness is defined with the barrier method, then the structure
is not separated from the processes that take place on it or the environment it is part of.
Robustness is desirable property in Structural Integrity Management because of the its purpose.
Namely to ensure the structure's safety and suitability. This means that it is a requirement in SIM to
maintain robustness. The NORSOK N-005  /3/ makes this connection between SIM, barriers and
robustness, but it is missing from the API and ISO standards.
The fifth objective is to investigate how Structural Integrity Management processes can contribute
to maintaining robustness and barriers.
The SIM process starts after fabrication, after commissioning with a baseline inspection or in a
different  time  close  to  installation.  This  results  in  that  the  SIM  process  does  not  have  the
possibilities to implement barriers that would ensure robustness the same way as the design process
has. Those who work with the SIM process has to take a finished structure in the condition that it is
in as a starting point for their work. Therefore it is more focused in the SIM process to maintain the
built-in robustness than to implement new ones. However, it  can be part of the SIM process to
evaluate  the  in-service  barriers  and  to  alter  functions,  adjust  performance  standards  of  barrier
elements.  The  SIM  process  contributes  to  ensuring  initial  robustness  and  maintaining  barrier
functions because:
• the  purpose  of  SIM is  to  maintain  fit-for-purpose  condition  with  respect  to  safety  and
suitability. This  is  usually  the  closest  possible  to  the  intended design  condition.  Unless
changes in regulatory requirements  make it  necessary to  deviate  from design intentions,
reparations on the structure are aimed to reinstate a close-to-design state.
• the SIM process contributes also because its intention is to have updated knowledge on the
real as-is condition of the structure (inspections, surveillance), as well as it continuously
documents its regulatory compliance status (change management). Structures degrade over
time in a  pace  that  reparations  usually  cannot  keep up with.  Applying SIM procedures
results in awareness of ill conditioned parts, or issues that increase the risk connected to
platform operation. The updated knowledge enables risk mitigation and informs the operator
about where barriers have fails.
• the SIM process builds a background knowledge database for improvements. I.e. all future
improvements have a solid basis due to the available information on structure history.
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5.1  Possibilities for further studies
Further  studies  could  be  conducted  in  connection  with  the  consequence  index  calculation  in
Appendix B in order to verify or reject the engineering use of the methods described.
In connection with robustness, barriers and Structural Integrity Management, it could be a subject of
further investigation how the three topics could be made more apparently connected.
In  the  course  of  establishing  barrier  strategy  and  performance  criteria,  the  hazards  and  the
corresponding barriers are precisely identified. Surveillances and findings concern a specific barrier
or barriers. Each critical  and unmitigated finding weakens the barrier(s) that it  belongs to.  The
system  of  barriers  can  be  established  either  according  to  Figure  4.5 or  in  a  custom  defined
environment of safety principles.
Figure 4.5: Six principles of safe design, source /39/ (repeated)
A study could be performed to find out if it is possible and practically viable to connect findings to
barriers, this way creating a system where barrier status is constantly updated and trended.
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Appendix A
Evaluation considerations for inspection
strategy
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The following table is based on ISO19902 /2/
Table A1 Factors to be considered in the Evaluation process of structural integrity 
management
Considerations and factors
Structure age, condition, original design situations and criteria and comparison with current design
situations and criteria
• Remaining service life, desire to extend service life
• Platform operating and maintenance personnel  should be consulted to see if  they have
observed  conditions  (corrosion  evidence,  movement  in  conductor  guides  or  riser/J-
tube/caisson supports, excessive deformations or deflections, unusual vibrations, change in
platform sway response to waves, etc.) that should be evaluated
Analysis results and assumptions for original design or subsequent assessments
• Computed utilizations and fatigue lives
• Original design code and version
• Degree of sophistication and conservatism in the design analyses
• Amount of conservatism in design implementation, acceptance criteria
• Intentional over-design for fatigue to reduce periodic inspection requirements
• Material specification
Structure reserve strength and structural redundancy
Fatigue sensitivity
Degree of conservatism or uncertainty in specified environmental conditions
• Data source
• Degree of certainty or conservatism in environmental conditions (wave, current, wind) and 
design assumptions (marine growth, earthquake spectra)
• Sensitivity of storm actions to return period. For example, how much difference in 
magnitude of actions is there between the 10 year, 100 year, and 1 000 year events?
• Relative severity of sea states for fatigue and storm conditions, since fatigue tends to be 
important where operational sea states are not far below design storm conditions
• Marine growth type (hard, soft), percent coverage, thickness, variation with depth, 
roughness
Extent of inspection during fabrication and after transportation and installation
Fabrication quality and occurrences of any rework or re-welding
• Unusual or special circumstances, rework/re-welding, wind induced vibrations/fatigue 
• Extent of inspection during fabrication Fabrication quality
• Welding procedures and specifications
Damage (including fatigue damage) during transportation or installation
• Occurrence of any damage or vibrations during transportation
• Extent of inspection after transportation
• Severity of transport conditions and actual exposure (for example transoceanic versus local
tow)
• Occurrence of any damage during installation Extent of inspection after installation
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• Extent of deviations from design assumptions (e.g. air gap between deck and mean sea 
level)
Operational experience, including previous in-service inspection results and lessons from 
performance of other structures
• Degree of vigilance in reporting/evaluating accidental events.
• Extent of deviations from design assumptions (e.g. sea states, marine growth, platform 
purpose)
• Modifications and additions of risers, service caissons, topsides, etc.
• Occurrence of any damage
• Absolute years of service
• Years of service relative to design service life
• Subsidence
• Scope of prior inspections
• Tools and techniques used
• Anomalies discovered
• Trends identified
• Failures or problems encountered with certain components under certain conditions
• Success of similar structures in same locale/region
Modifications, additions and repairs or strengthening
• Underlying causes necessitating repair or strengthening In-service performance of repairs 
or strengthening
Occurrence of accidental and severe environmental events
Criticality of structure to other operations
Structure location (geographical area, water depth)
• Particular regional experience
Debris
Structural monitoring data, if available
Potential reuse or removal intents
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Appendix B
Consequence and Robustness factor
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B1 Introduction
This Appendix documents the calculations performed to test the consequence and robustness factor
which are based on Olmati et al.  /1/ including the modifications described in the main part of the
thesis in Section 4.2.4.1 part 4).
In this method the consequence and robustness factors are based on the Eigen values of the free
vibration modes of the structure in intact and damaged condition.
The structure subject to the analyses is an offshore bridge. No geometry, sections or other properties
were directly used from real life structures, but the B01 and B02 bridges of the Ekofisk M platform
served as a pattern and inspiration.
B2 Analysis software
The presented analyses have been performed using the educational version of AxisVM (32) 13 R3g
which is the product of InterCAD Ltd. 
The developer company introduces AxisVM as “Civil engineers on 5 continents use AxisVM for the
analysis of structures with confidence that their final engineering product will meet the most up-to-
date  engineering  analysis  and  design  requirements.  For  nearly  25  years,  AxisVM  has  been
recognized as the industry standard for Building Analysis and Design Software. 
Today, continuing in the same tradition, AxisVM has evolved into a completely integrated building
analysis and design environment. The system built around a physical object based graphical user
interface,  powered  by  targeted  new  special  purpose  algorithms  for  analysis  and  design,  with
interfaces for drafting and manufacturing, is redefining standards of integration, productivity and
technical innovation.
Structural analysis software that is intuitive and graphically driven so it is exceptionally easy to use
and truly easy to start.
Available  Languages:  English,  French,  German,  Dutch,  Czech,  Romanian,  Slovak,  Hungarian,
Spanish, Italian, Serbian, Polish, Bulgarian, Portuguese.
Linear, nonlinear, buckling, vibration, seismic and dynamic analysis for truss, beam, rib, membrane,
plate and shell two dimension and three dimension structures. Pushover and time history analysis.
Code  checking  and  design  modules  for  steel,  concrete  and  timber  materials.
Eurocode  Design:  EN1990,  EN1991,  EN1992,  EN1993,  EN1995,  EN1997,  EN1998
Import/Export to DXF, IFC, SDNF, ASCII, STL file formats and many others. Direct exchange with
Tekla Structures. Dynamic report maker with image and table captures automatically updated with
model changes.” /2/
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B2.1 Solving the free vibration problem
The Eigen values, frequencies and mode shapes are calculated for an undamped, linear system. In
the used solver, no stress stiffening is taken into account, i.e. the stiffening effect of axial tension of
the truss members is not accounted for.
In the calculations a diagonal mass matrix was used, this being sufficient because it is the global
response of the bridge that is of interest and the structure consists of enough nodes and members.
B3 Model description
B3.1 Geometry
As shown in Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 the bridge is a space truss with a square bridge
cross section, with a length of 48m (12x4m), a width of 4m and a height of 5m. 
The bridge  has  a  symmetric  geometry, except  for  that  the  lower bracing  accommodates  to  the
pinned longitudinal support at the “A” raster at the middle of the width of the bridge.
Figure 3.1: Geometry - Elevation
B3.2 Boundary conditions
All the boundary conditions are moment released, i.e. all the supports are pinned. At the “A” raster,
the two supports at the sides can take up loads in the vertical (Z) and horizontal (Y only) direction,
while the support in the middle provides constrain in the longitudinal (X) direction of the bridge.
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At the “B” raster the two supports at the sides give a fixity in the global vertical (Z) and bridge
lateral (Y) direction.
B3.3 Materials
Only one type of material (steel) has been used in the modeling, since the performed calculations
(Eigen value analysis of a free vibration problem) only require the E modulus (2.1 x 1011 Pa), the
material density (7850 kg/m3) and the cross section properties of the used beam profiles.
Figure 3.2: Geometry - Plan view – Upper and lower bracing is shown
B3.4 Sections
As  shown  in  Figure  3.4 the  bridge  is  built-up  mainly  of  tubular  sections,  with  box  section
reinforcements at the supports. There are also box sections (RHS) used for the lower and upper
cross beams. The OD in the cross section name stands for outer diameter. The thickness in mm is
the second number in the section name.
The main chord sections are OD300x10, with some reinforcement (OD350x16) where connection
makes with the box sections make it necessary at the ends.
The diagonals for the vertical loads are OD160x10, except for the last tension and compression
diagonal which are OD200x12.
Page: B6 of 28 Appendix B
Structural Integrity Management ensuring robustness and barriers
Istvan Szarka
Figure 3.3: Geometry - Isometric view
Figure 3.4: Beam cross sections - Color coded
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B3.5 Damaged members
In  Figure 3.5 the members that will be removed one-by-one from the structure are marked with
numbers. There are six various members near the “B” end, and one chord member close to mid-
span.  These members  are  assumed to be damaged,  and hence non-load bearing.  It  is  only one
member  at  a  time that  is  removed from the  intact/undamaged model,  this  way the  subsequent
analyses are member importance analyses, of a certain sort.
Figure 3.5: Members denoting the damaged models
Member 1: Lower chord at the “B” end, above support
Member 2: Upper chord at the “B” end, above support
Member 3: Main vertical diagonal at the “B” end
Member 4: Main lower diagonal for horizontal loads at the “B” end
Member 5: Main upper diagonal for horizontal loads at the “B” end
Member 6: Main vertical (column) above support at the “B” end
Member 7: Lower chord member close to mid-span.
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B4 Free vibration results for the intact model
In Table 4.1 and from Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.10 the results of the free vibration analysis is shown.
There are 25 Eigen modes computed which range from 2.97 Hz to 45.32 Hz (the first 11  is included
in the figures below)
Table 4.1: Results of the free vibration analysis – Intact / Undamaged model
No f [Hz] T [s] omega* Eval (λun) Error
1 2.97 0.34 18.66 348.03 2.46E-12
2 4.66 0.22 29.26 856.16 3.86E-13
3 6.02 0.17 37.83 1431.38 7.69E-13
4 6.57 0.15 41.27 1703.51 5.52E-13
5 8.43 0.12 52.95 2803.21 1.90E-13
6 10.98 0.09 68.97 4757.04 2.66E-13
7 13.09 0.08 82.24 6762.85 6.89E-14
8 13.35 0.08 83.85 7031.05 2.20E-13
9 15.1 0.07 94.9 9006.01 3.48E-14
10 15.57 0.06 97.83 9571.01 1.11E-13
11 21.91 0.05 137.65 18948.11 4.69E-14
12 22.2 0.05 139.47 19452.21 2.42E-14
13 24.56 0.04 154.28 23803.57 3.93E-14
14 25.08 0.04 157.56 24825.58 2.58E-14
15 30.09 0.03 189.03 35734.13 1.16E-12
16 31.51 0.03 197.95 39184.9 2.95E-12
17 33.25 0.03 208.89 43635.05 4.34E-11
18 33.94 0.03 213.28 45487.27 1.19E-10
19 34.92 0.03 219.41 48139.27 4.53E-10
20 37.45 0.03 235.28 55357.19 5.24E-09
21 39.98 0.03 251.23 63115.9 7.92E-08
22 41.23 0.02 259.05 67107.76 1.39E-07
23 41.99 0.02 263.82 69598.7 2.63E-07
24 43.78 0.02 275.11 75684.5 1.72E-06
25 45.32 0.02 284.76 81086.66 5.84E-06
* omega (ω) is in rad/s
In Table 4.1 the Eigen value (λun) is in the Eval column which equals ω2. The low values in the Error
column ensure that the computed results are reliable.
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Figure 4.1: Intact model - 1st mode shape - 2.97 Hz
Figure 4.2: Intact model - 2nd mode shape - 4.66 Hz
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Figure 4.3: Intact model - 3rd mode shape - 6.02 Hz
Figure 4.4: Intact model - 4th mode shape - 6.57 Hz
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Figure 4.5: Intact model - 5th mode shape - 8.43 Hz
Figure 4.6: Intact model - 6th mode shape - 10.98 Hz
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Figure 4.7: Intact model - 7th mode shape - 13.09 Hz
Figure 4.8: Intact model - 8th mode shape - 13.35 Hz
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Figure 4.9: Intact model - 9th mode shape - 15.10 Hz
Figure 4.10: Intact model - 10th mode shape - 15.57 Hz
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Figure 4.11: Intact model - 11th mode shape - 21.91 Hz
B5 Free vibration results and Consequence / Robustness 
factors for the damaged scenarios
In this chapter robustness is measured based on the methodology proposed by Olmati et al. /1/, but
with the modification that, instead of using the Eigen values of the static stiffness matrix, it is the
Eigen values of the free vibration problem that is used.
A set of damage scenarios are assumed where the damage is represented with a consequence factor
(Cfscenario in Formula 5.1). The damage scenario is defined as the loss of one or several members (in
this thesis only one member). Robustness is expressed as the complement of of C fscenario. (Formula
5.2)
C f
scenario=max (
λf
un−λ f
dam
λ f
un 100)
f=1. . N
Formula 5.1
Rscenario=100−C f
scenario Formula 5.2
The consequence factor and the robustness is expressed in %. The higher percentage of C means
higher consequences and less robustness in the given failure scenario.
In the above formulas λfun and  λfdam are the Eigen value number f of the free vibration problem in
the  structure's intact and damaged condition.
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B5.1 Summary of the results in section B8
In Table 5.1 a summary is provided of the results from section B8.
Table 5.1: Summary of results
Member Consequence (Cf) Critical Eigen mode
01 – Lower chord at support 40% 3
02 – Upper chord at support 33% 11
03 – Main diagonal (vertical) at support 26% 11
04 – Lower diagonal (horizontal) at support 33% 11
05 – Upper diagonal (horizontal) at support 34% 11
06 – Column above support 35% 11
07 – Lower chord at mid-span 49% 1
Initially it has to be noted about the results that many members have their most critical Eigen mode
as no. 11, and the consequence is very often close to 30-35% with small variation.
Group of chord members: It is member 01, 02 and 07 that belong to this group. Member 01 and 07
have the highest consequence among all the investigated members in Table 5.1. From beam theory
it is susceptible that member 07 should have a high consequence, but it is unlikely that member 01
has a consequence that is very close to member 07. It is even more unlikely that member 02 has a
lower consequence than member 01. The reason for this is, if the elevation view is looked at and we
imagine removing member 01, there is still a stiff, supported triangle transferring vertical forces to
the top of the column. On the other hand if member 02 is removed the stiff triangle at the support
becomes a bit “mechanism-like” in its connection to the main vertical girder of the bridge.
Diagonals: It is worth noting that in the results vertical diagonal have a lower consequence than the
horizontals,  as  well  as  that  there  is  not  a  significant  difference  between  the  lower  and  upper
diagonal.  This  latter  is  unlikely  because  the  loads  will  have  to  be  transferred  anyways  to  the
supports at the lower points.
B5.1.1 Evaluation of the used method
Arguments in favor of the method (pros):
• Easy to perform the analysis
• Can be performed in the vast majority of structural FEM software
• Low on computational resources
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Arguments against the method (cons):
• the results seem to contradict the gut feeling about the consequence of the members
• the results are not load specific: many structures are specifically designed for loads from a
certain direction that is usually dimensioning (e.g. beam bridge for vertical loads)
B6 Modified methodology
B6.1 Comparing the consequence values with code-check results
There seemed to be a need to compare the results with some other consequence measurements to
see if the trends visible in section B5.1 can be verified or contradicted some way, which is more
quantifiable than engineering gut feeling.
Ideally a push-over analysis would be performed to see the structure's behavior in a post-elastic
condition. Due to software limitations, it has been decided to substitute this with using elastic code
check results.
The following procedure has been followed:
• There has been a vertical load-case (DIM-Z) created that has a dummy load (10kN/m) along
on the two lower chords (Figure 6.1)
Figure 6.1: Vertical loadcase (DIM-Z)
• There has been a code-check load-combination created where the DIM-Z load-case is scale
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in such a way that the highest code-check result is 0.8 (Figure 6.2,  Figure 6.3 and  Figure
6.4).  There was Eurocode  /3/ used for code check with γM0=1.15. The other code-check
parameters were set in a simple but conservative way.
Figure 6.2: Scaling DIM-Z
Figure 6.3: Code check parameters (Eurocode)
• Afterwards the selected members were removed one-by-one from the structure and the code-
check was re-run. The summary of results is shown in Table 6.1
Table 6.1: Summary of code-check results
Intact
Model
Removed member
01 02 03 04 05 06 07
UFmax UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ UFmax Δ
0.80 0.80 0.05 1.69 1.60 1.44 1.25 0.80 0.05 0.80 0.01 1.56 1.40 2.16 1.39
The results in  Table 6.1 are all maximum values. For each model with one removed member the
maximum utilization factor and the maximum UF change (Δ) is shown. The change in the UF value
gives a hint about how critical it was to remove a member, while Δ can show, to some extent, how
much the internal forces were rearranged due to the member removal.
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It is visible by the first look that member 01, 04 and 05 made very little change in the utilizations.
Figure 6.4: Utilization tuned to 0.8 in the chord at midspan
Figure 6.5: Result summary
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In Figure 6.5:
• UF is the utilization factor from Table 6.1, the values are scaled
• Δ from Table 6.1, the values are scaled
• C-1 is the consequence according to  Formula 5.1, with the modification that is is not the
maximum difference chosen from all the Eigen values, but it is the difference in Eigen value
no.1. The first Eigen mode is a horizontal bending mode (Figure 4.1).
• C-2, similar to C-1, but it is Eigen mode no.2 from (Figure 4.2) which the Eigen values are
taken. This mode is a vertical bending and the shape resembles very much to the expected
deformation plot from gravity or vertical live loads (negative).
• C-max is the consequence according to Formula 5.1, the results are from Table 5.1
B6.2 Evaluation of the modified methodology
It can be seen in the section above that the real modification compared to Formula 5.1 is that instead
of taking maximum difference from all the investigated Eigen values, it is one particular taken. I.e.
instead of looking at all the modes, one or some of them is selected on the basis of having similarity
between the mode shape and the expected deformation plot from the given load.
The  Figure 6.5 was created to highlight the  positive correlation between UF and C-2, and also
between Δ and C-2.  The correlation between UF and C-2 is true for all members but 07, and the
correlation between Δ and C-2 seems to be present for all members.
It is worth looking at the line of C-1 which belongs to the first horizontal bending mode. There
seems to be a negative correlation with UF at member 04 and 05, but the results match the gut-
feeling of member 04 having higher consequence (lower brace) than 05.
Compared to the original methodology, it is an improvement that there seems to be a way to become
more load specific, or directional.
B7 Possible further improvements
In spite of the the visible correlation in the modified methodology, there should be done many tests /
analyses to be able to verify and prove its reliability, furthermore:
1) Consequence values should be compared to push-over analysis results
2) It  should  be  investigated  how  results  are  affected  with  structures  that  include  high
concentrated masses.
3) It should be looked at how the involved mass in each Eigen mode is in connection with the
results – e.g. consequence value more or less relevant if participating mass is high or low,
totally or in a given direction
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4) Find out if the Cmax values cannot be used or if they imply a behavior that can reveal non-
load specific properties of the structure.
B8 Tables of results of the vibration analyses
B8.1 Member 01 – Lower chord at support
Table 8.1: Results of the free vibration analysis – Damaged model – Member 01 removed
No f [Hz] T [s] omega EVal (λdam) EVal (λun) Error Cfscenario
1 2.59 0.39 16.26 264.53 348.03 2.02E-12 24%
2 4.4 0.23 27.63 763.58 856.16 2.01E-12 11%
3 4.66 0.21 29.3 858.76 1431.38 4.41E-13 40%
4 6.34 0.16 39.81 1585.15 1703.51 5.68E-13 7%
5 8.42 0.12 52.88 2796.72 2803.21 1.71E-13 0%
6 8.81 0.11 55.36 3065.1 4757.04 3.04E-13 36%
7 11.05 0.09 69.42 4819.08 6762.85 1.92E-13 29%
8 13.27 0.08 83.41 6956.6 7031.05 1.57E-13 1%
9 15.09 0.07 94.82 8991.75 9006.01 4.22E-14 0%
10 15.21 0.07 95.56 9132.67 9571.01 5.36E-14 5%
11 17.06 0.06 107.16 11483.99 18948.11 1.28E-13 39%
12 22.05 0.05 138.55 19195.02 19452.21 4.26E-14 1%
13 24.24 0.04 152.3 23194.43 23803.57 3.47E-14 3%
14 24.8 0.04 155.85 24288.89 24825.58 1.58E-14 2%
15 26.47 0.04 166.32 27662.31 35734.13 2.77E-14 23%
16 30.47 0.03 191.47 36661.89 39184.9 4.92E-13 6%
17 33.23 0.03 208.81 43601.14 43635.05 3.13E-11 0%
18 33.37 0.03 209.7 43972.1 45487.27 1.81E-11 3%
19 34.91 0.03 219.32 48102.35 48139.27 2.68E-10 0%
20 35.79 0.03 224.89 50573.96 55357.19 1.62E-10 9%
21 38.1 0.03 239.37 57299.5 63115.9 7.12E-09 9%
22 41.27 0.02 259.32 67246.97 67107.76 1.31E-07 0%
23 41.91 0.02 263.32 69336.85 69598.7 1.05E-07 0%
24 42.88 0.02 269.4 72576.15 75684.5 3.23E-07 4%
25 44.44 0.02 279.23 77970.74 81086.66 5.64E-06 4%
max Cf: 40%
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From  Table 8.1 it is visible that CfMember01= 40% and the removal of Member 01 has the greatest
effect on Eigen mode no. 3. 
B8.2 Member 02 – Upper chord at support
Table 8.2: Results of the free vibration analysis – Damaged model – Member 02 removed
No f [Hz] T [s] omega EVal EVal Error Cf
1 2.92 0.34 18.37 337.48 348.03 1.78E-12 3%
2 4.06 0.25 25.52 651.33 856.16 7.87E-13 24%
3 5.72 0.18 35.95 1292.26 1431.38 9.22E-13 10%
4 6.54 0.15 41.1 1689.33 1703.51 4.96E-13 1%
5 8.01 0.13 50.3 2529.87 2803.21 5.13E-13 10%
6 9.08 0.11 57.07 3257.01 4757.04 4.89E-13 32%
7 11.6 0.09 72.86 5309.03 6762.85 1.90E-13 21%
8 13.09 0.08 82.25 6764.89 7031.05 5.58E-14 4%
9 13.61 0.07 85.53 7314.53 9006.01 1.21E-13 19%
10 15.43 0.07 96.92 9394.06 9571.01 6.59E-14 2%
11 17.99 0.06 113.03 12775.38 18948.11 9.68E-14 33%
12 22.01 0.05 138.3 19126.83 19452.21 5.22E-14 2%
13 22.3 0.05 140.09 19626.33 23803.57 2.58E-14 18%
14 25.12 0.04 157.81 24903.5 24825.58 1.07E-13 0%
15 27.95 0.04 175.64 30848.51 35734.13 8.08E-12 14%
16 30.17 0.03 189.55 35929.47 39184.9 4.78E-11 8%
17 31.58 0.03 198.43 39375.62 43635.05 3.78E-10 10%
18 33.86 0.03 212.76 45266.5 45487.27 1.98E-09 0%
19 34.64 0.03 217.64 47368.6 48139.27 1.02E-08 2%
20 37.43 0.03 235.19 55316.68 55357.19 8.44E-08 0%
21 37.78 0.03 237.39 56353.27 63115.9 2.26E-07 11%
22 39.99 0.03 251.28 63142.11 67107.76 3.90E-07 6%
23 42.04 0.02 264.13 69762.94 69598.7 2.22E-06 0%
24 43.8 0.02 275.18 75722.14 75684.5 5.25E-06 0%
25 44.99 0.02 282.65 79892.61 81086.66 5.51E-06 1%
max Cf: 33%
It can be seen in Table 8.2 that CfMember02= 33% and the removal of Member 02 has the greatest effect
on Eigen mode no. 11.
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B8.3 Member 03 – Main diagonal (vertical) at support
Table 8.3: Results of the free vibration analysis – Damaged model – Member 03 removed
No f [Hz] T [s] omega EVal EVal Error Cf
1 2.92 0.34 18.32 335.52 348.03 2.25E-12 4%
2 4.17 0.24 26.19 685.73 856.16 4.65E-13 20%
3 5.73 0.17 36.02 1297.47 1431.38 5.04E-13 9%
4 6.57 0.15 41.25 1701.53 1703.51 8.56E-13 0%
5 8.32 0.12 52.26 2730.79 2803.21 1.25E-13 3%
6 10.06 0.1 63.22 3997.16 4757.04 2.15E-13 16%
7 11.42 0.09 71.75 5148.6 6762.85 2.33E-13 24%
8 13.11 0.08 82.4 6789.46 7031.05 4.38E-14 3%
9 14.28 0.07 89.72 8050.57 9006.01 5.32E-14 11%
10 15.64 0.06 98.25 9652.25 9571.01 7.52E-14 1%
11 18.88 0.05 118.6 14065.02 18948.11 6.87E-14 26%
12 22.23 0.05 139.7 19517.17 19452.21 1.98E-14 0%
13 23.5 0.04 147.67 21806.57 23803.57 1.83E-14 8%
14 25.05 0.04 157.38 24769.66 24825.58 2.74E-14 0%
15 28.1 0.04 176.53 31161.57 35734.13 1.86E-14 13%
16 31.57 0.03 198.33 39334.39 39184.9 4.50E-14 0%
17 32.29 0.03 202.91 41173.59 43635.05 1.21E-13 6%
18 33.99 0.03 213.57 45613.81 45487.27 7.01E-13 0%
19 34.86 0.03 219.05 47981.35 48139.27 1.38E-11 0%
20 36.47 0.03 229.14 52505.97 55357.19 1.89E-11 5%
21 40.21 0.03 252.65 63829.86 63115.9 7.82E-09 1%
22 40.48 0.03 254.36 64698.07 67107.76 6.26E-09 4%
23 41.79 0.02 262.6 68957.01 69598.7 1.03E-08 1%
24 43.58 0.02 273.81 74970.03 75684.5 1.07E-07 1%
25 45.68 0.02 287.01 82372.39 81086.66 2.85E-06 2%
max Cf: 26%
It can be seen in Table 8.3 that CfMember02= 26% and the removal of Member 03 has the greatest effect
on Eigen mode no. 11.
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B8.4 Member 04 – Lower diagonal (horizontal) at support
Table 8.4: Results of the free vibration analysis – Damaged model – Member 04 removed
No f [Hz] T [s] omega EVal EVal Error Cf
1 2.81 0.36 17.63 310.72 348.03 1.66E-12 11%
2 4.66 0.22 29.28 857.16 856.16 7.88E-13 0%
3 5.12 0.2 32.18 1035.87 1431.38 1.94E-12 28%
4 6.37 0.16 40 1599.92 1703.51 6.44E-13 6%
5 8.43 0.12 52.94 2802.35 2803.21 2.87E-13 0%
6 9.93 0.1 62.42 3896.1 4757.04 3.25E-13 18%
7 11.01 0.09 69.16 4783.77 6762.85 2.90E-13 29%
8 13.28 0.08 83.43 6959.94 7031.05 1.17E-13 1%
9 15.12 0.07 94.99 9023.82 9006.01 6.62E-14 0%
10 15.34 0.07 96.38 9289.18 9571.01 1.10E-13 3%
11 17.97 0.06 112.89 12744.4 18948.11 8.84E-14 33%
12 22.08 0.05 138.71 19241.5 19452.21 4.39E-14 1%
13 24.35 0.04 153 23408.84 23803.57 4.21E-14 2%
14 24.91 0.04 156.5 24493.12 24825.58 1.95E-14 1%
15 27.28 0.04 171.41 29380.46 35734.13 1.52E-13 18%
16 30.61 0.03 192.3 36979.46 39184.9 1.40E-11 6%
17 33.2 0.03 208.58 43505.25 43635.05 2.58E-10 0%
18 33.8 0.03 212.36 45095.14 45487.27 2.02E-10 1%
19 35 0.03 219.9 48354.98 48139.27 2.17E-09 0%
20 35.93 0.03 225.78 50977.12 55357.19 1.51E-09 8%
21 38.37 0.03 241.09 58124.53 63115.9 2.12E-08 8%
22 41.23 0.02 259.03 67094.17 67107.76 3.54E-07 0%
23 42.03 0.02 264.07 69731.95 69598.7 1.24E-06 0%
24 43.16 0.02 271.15 73523.59 75684.5 8.31E-07 3%
25 44.64 0.02 280.49 78677.18 81086.66 5.99E-06 3%
max Cf: 33%
It can be seen in Table 8.4 that CfMember02= 33% and the removal of Member 04 has the greatest effect
on Eigen mode no. 11.
Page: B24 of 28 Appendix B
Structural Integrity Management ensuring robustness and barriers
Istvan Szarka
B8.5 Member 05 – Upper diagonal (horizontal) at support
Table 8.5: Results of the free vibration analysis – Damaged model – Member 05 removed
No f [Hz] T [s] omega EVal EVal Error Cf
1 2.86 0.35 17.95 322.3 348.03 1.98E-12 7%
2 4.66 0.22 29.26 856.39 856.16 4.02E-13 0%
3 6.02 0.17 37.83 1431.43 1431.38 5.72E-13 0%
4 6.61 0.15 41.51 1723.49 1703.51 4.33E-13 1%
5 8.43 0.12 52.96 2805.1 2803.21 1.98E-13 0%
6 11.02 0.09 69.25 4794.97 4757.04 2.23E-13 1%
7 11.75 0.09 73.84 5453.05 6762.85 1.66E-13 19%
8 13.09 0.08 82.24 6763.99 7031.05 5.48E-14 4%
9 14.43 0.07 90.67 8221.15 9006.01 8.06E-14 9%
10 15.14 0.07 95.12 9048.33 9571.01 3.49E-14 5%
11 17.86 0.06 112.24 12597.76 18948.11 4.21E-14 34%
12 22.2 0.05 139.51 19463.74 19452.21 2.56E-14 0%
13 23.05 0.04 144.84 20979.72 23803.57 2.10E-13 12%
14 24.88 0.04 156.36 24447.14 24825.58 4.25E-14 2%
15 27.23 0.04 171.1 29275.8 35734.13 2.41E-13 18%
16 31.5 0.03 197.93 39178.09 39184.9 2.50E-12 0%
17 31.68 0.03 199.03 39613.94 43635.05 7.89E-12 9%
18 33.64 0.03 211.39 44685 45487.27 1.32E-10 2%
19 35.02 0.03 220.06 48426.3 48139.27 2.59E-10 1%
20 36.02 0.03 226.33 51226.65 55357.19 1.45E-09 7%
21 39.61 0.03 248.86 61930.48 63115.9 1.99E-08 2%
22 40.01 0.03 251.38 63190.15 67107.76 1.09E-07 6%
23 41.81 0.02 262.72 69021.1 69598.7 1.37E-07 1%
24 43.64 0.02 274.17 75168.61 75684.5 1.60E-06 1%
25 45.31 0.02 284.72 81065.23 81086.66 4.15E-06 0%
max Cf: 34%
It can be seen in Table 8.5 that CfMember02= 34% and the removal of Member 05 has the greatest effect
on Eigen mode no. 11.
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B8.6 Member 06 – Column above support
Table 8.6: Results of the free vibration analysis – Damaged model – Member 06 removed
No f [Hz] T [s] omega EVal EVal Error Cf
1 2.51 0.4 15.8 249.59 348.03 3.35E-12 28%
2 3.9 0.26 24.48 599.39 856.16 9.99E-13 30%
3 5.42 0.18 34.08 1161.34 1431.38 7.84E-13 19%
4 6.13 0.16 38.51 1483.38 1703.51 1.04E-12 13%
5 8.07 0.12 50.74 2574.17 2803.21 1.28E-13 8%
6 9.14 0.11 57.41 3295.34 4757.04 3.49E-13 31%
7 11.26 0.09 70.77 5009.03 6762.85 1.94E-13 26%
8 13.09 0.08 82.23 6761.97 7031.05 5.01E-14 4%
9 13.98 0.07 87.86 7719.73 9006.01 9.68E-14 14%
10 15.57 0.06 97.82 9568.67 9571.01 7.51E-14 0%
11 17.64 0.06 110.82 12281.32 18948.11 8.84E-14 35%
12 22.14 0.05 139.1 19347.73 19452.21 1.85E-14 1%
13 23.09 0.04 145.05 21039.49 23803.57 3.50E-14 12%
14 25.02 0.04 157.22 24716.88 24825.58 3.88E-14 0%
15 26.99 0.04 169.61 28766.06 35734.13 2.77E-14 19%
16 31.19 0.03 195.99 38411.9 39184.9 1.69E-12 2%
17 31.79 0.03 199.75 39899.45 43635.05 2.11E-12 9%
18 33.94 0.03 213.27 45485.52 45487.27 1.29E-11 0%
19 34.71 0.03 218.1 47568 48139.27 2.01E-10 1%
20 35.8 0.03 224.93 50593.7 55357.19 2.42E-10 9%
21 39.02 0.03 245.18 60115.64 63115.9 7.01E-09 5%
22 40.03 0.03 251.5 63249.83 67107.76 5.32E-08 6%
23 41.72 0.02 262.15 68722.67 69598.7 1.74E-07 1%
24 43.04 0.02 270.41 73120.38 75684.5 3.56E-07 3%
25 44.79 0.02 281.41 79189.1 81086.66 3.20E-06 2%
max Cf: 35%
It can be seen in Table 8.6 that CfMember02= 35% and the removal of Member 06 has the greatest effect
on Eigen mode no. 11.
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B8.7 Member 07 – Lower chord at mid-span
Table 8.7: Results of the free vibration analysis – Damaged model – Member 07 removed
No f [Hz] T [s] omega EVal EVal Error Cf
1 2.12 0.47 13.33 177.61 348.03 5.15E-12 49%
2 3.88 0.26 24.38 594.52 856.16 1.24E-12 31%
3 5.83 0.17 36.63 1342.12 1431.38 7.16E-13 6%
4 6.56 0.15 41.23 1699.92 1703.51 6.41E-13 0%
5 8.4 0.12 52.79 2786.43 2803.21 2.03E-13 1%
6 10.78 0.09 67.74 4588.67 4757.04 2.19E-13 4%
7 12.61 0.08 79.24 6278.89 6762.85 1.10E-13 7%
8 13.34 0.08 83.83 7028.26 7031.05 1.47E-13 0%
9 15.04 0.07 94.49 8928.28 9006.01 6.24E-14 1%
10 15.36 0.07 96.53 9317.33 9571.01 9.51E-14 3%
11 19.73 0.05 123.97 15369.39 18948.11 4.69E-14 19%
12 21.94 0.05 137.83 18995.94 19452.21 3.53E-14 2%
13 23.89 0.04 150.11 22532.58 23803.57 1.88E-14 5%
14 24.89 0.04 156.38 24454.66 24825.58 2.69E-14 1%
15 29.61 0.03 186.03 34607.78 35734.13 2.34E-13 3%
16 30.42 0.03 191.15 36539.97 39184.9 6.17E-13 7%
17 32.87 0.03 206.53 42652.71 43635.05 6.11E-12 2%
18 33.86 0.03 212.73 45254.42 45487.27 6.26E-12 1%
19 34.1 0.03 214.27 45913.31 48139.27 1.51E-10 5%
20 37.36 0.03 234.74 55103.91 55357.19 1.97E-09 0%
21 39.64 0.03 249.09 62046.6 63115.9 1.09E-08 2%
22 40.97 0.02 257.42 66263.26 67107.76 7.02E-08 1%
23 41.73 0.02 262.2 68748.89 69598.7 5.98E-07 1%
24 43.74 0.02 274.84 75537.17 75684.5 1.04E-06 0%
25 44.84 0.02 281.72 79368.97 81086.66 6.56E-06 2%
max Cf: 49%
It can be seen in Table 8.7 that CfMember02= 49% and the removal of Member 07 has the greatest effect
on Eigen mode no. 1.
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Appendix C
DNV GL' SIMS program
Screenshots and functions
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C1 Introduction
DNV  GL's  SIMS  software  (Structural  Integrity  Management  System)  is  suited  to  assist  the
operation of fixed offshore structural assets with particular focus on structural integrity, change and
inspection management. The goal of the software is to maintain and give access to the database,
with special structural engineering aspects, that contains data on facilities, their yearly inspections,
findings and the follow-ups of analyses. Archiving is an important feature of the program.
It has to be emphasized that the used SIMS version in this thesis is a test version, hence the database
does not contain data that match reality, even though platform names may match those of real
platforms.
In  Figure 1.1 the typical SIMS screen is shown, which has 5 distinguished areas. The Task bar
which lists the different portals, and the sub functions within each portal. 
The “Listing of main data” area usually contains a list of items that belong to the category selected
in the Task bar. It is usually possible to perform searches here or filter the list based on aggregated
KPI statuses.
Below this there is the “detailed information tabs” where detailed information can be seen of the
selected item from the list above. 
The “3D viewer” part can show the structural configuration of the selected structure. It can display
the structure with proportional dimensions and correct cross sections. It purpose is to visually help
locating inspections, findings or to display statuses with color-coding. The structural members and
joints are identified with names which the 3D viewer can also display.
Figure 1.1: SIMS screen arrangement
The main sources used for this appendix is the SIMS manual /1/ and own use and experience with
SIMS.
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C2 Program modules
The program consists of several modules that allow insight to asset integrity statuses on levels that
vary from details of asset properties to high level (managerial) overviews through the use of KPI
propagation. The main sections of the program are (as they are displayed from the bottom to the
top) SIMS News, Find Portal (SIMS-f), Survey Portal (SIMS-s), Analysis Portal (SIMS-a), Ensure
Portal (SIMS-e) and the Administrate Portal.
The structure of this appendix in the following is that each portal (one-by-one) is introduced with
figures and there is a description of some of the most important available functions.
C2.1 SIMS News
In  Figure  2.1 the  SIMS  News  window  is  shown.  This  is  a  customizable  screen  to  broadcast
messages to the users of SIMS. It can display texts, pictures or hyperlinks. The customization can
be done by a user with administrative privileges in the Administrative Portal.
Figure 2.1: SIMS News
Page: C4 of 17 Appendix C
Structural Integrity Management ensuring robustness and barriers Istvan Szarka
C2.2 Find portal
The find portal is shown in Figure 2.2 with the Field map tab activated. This portal is used to select
a particular platform to be able to work with in the subsequent portals. The selected facility is
highlighted with blue color in the Facilities tool if the Field map tab is active. In the Field map the
other platforms are shown with different colors. It is the Legend button that gives information on
the actual meaning of colors, based on KPI propagation. From the Field map tab one can change to
the Field list tab (Figure 2.3), which gives a more detail oriented overview of the facilities included
in SIMS. Under the Field list basic information are available about the structure (e.g. installation
year, operator). It is also possible to see the Major Structure Areas of the facility. With the  KPI
status button (Figure 2.4) a pop-up window can be opened that makes it possible to choose a status
selector, this way filtering the list of facilities. The available options are:
• No KPI
• Finding Impact Mitigation Status (if the findings of the surveys have been mitigated)
• Inspection  Schedule  Status  (being  worked  on;  Assigned;  Completed;  Cancelled;  needs
Review)
• Work Package Schedule Status (planned, completed or being worked on)
• Campaign Schedule Status (completed or being worked on)
• Operational status (disused, operating, removed, not set)
• Configuration Status (fill, cathodic protection, marine growth, anode consumption, exterior
situation, clamp status)
The  Documents  tool in  the  Task  bar  enables  access  to  all  documents  (any  file)  stored  in  the
database. A particular document is stored only once in the SIMS database, but can be linked to
many locations. As many other objects in SIMS, documents are stored together with a series of
attributes, tags (meta-data) that include fields which are particular for the given document (e.g. title,
author, type, project, revision, etc.)
The Asset model tool in the Task bar shows the break down structure of the SIMS asset, i.e. what
major parts are distinguished for the structure in SIMS. The following areas can be defined for a
structure: A (Topside),  B (Bridge),  C (MSS – Module Support Structure),  F (Flare), G (GBS –
gravity based structure), H (Helideck), J (Jacket Main), K (Crane Pedestal), T (Jacket Bridge), W
(Seabed Template/Wells), M (Module), X (Foundation). The area can partly be seen in Figure 2.5
together with the structural view of the asset in the 3D viewer window. It can also be seen in this
picture that each area can have a series of typical data that are listed in the “detailed information
tabs” area together with linked documents, inspections and findings.
The  Generic Info tool in the Task bar provides quick access to key information and documents
considered to be of high importance by the company. A user with administrative rights can set up
the format of this page in the Administration portal. Data stored here can be viewed and edited also.
Beyond data a figure can also be attached to the Generic Info
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Figure 2.2: Find portal – Field map tab
Figure 2.3: Find portal – Field list tab
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Figure 2.4: Find portal – KPI status button
Figure 2.5: Find portal - Asset model with 3D viewer
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C2.3 Survey portal
The Survey Portal enables access to inspection campaigns, work packages withing the campaigns
and inspections within the work packages. Two tools (Campaigns and Work-packages) within the
Survey portal have a so-called work-flow mode, where the default SIMS window disappears and
the Task bar lists functions only typical for the given tool. 
The Campaigns tool (Figure 2.6) is designed for the administration and management of inspection
campaigns. The structuring method in SIMS for inspections is that the prescribed inspections are
organized into campaigns (typically inspections within the same year), and campaigns are further
structured down into work-packages which include inspections for a given facility in a given zone.
The Campaigns tool (outside the work-flow mode) lists basic details about the campaign and linked
documents.  The  structuring  implies  the  way  of  creating  and  arranging  inspections.  First  the
inspections are created, so they are assigned to campaigns, finally the work packages are created
inside the campaigns.
The  Work-packages  tool,  similarly  to  the Campaigns tool,  features  a  very typical  SIMS screen
(Figure  2.7),  listing  basic  details.  The  work  packages,  similarly  to  many  items  in  SIMS,  are
searchable.
One can enter the work-flow mode by double clicking the selected work-package, which opens at
the  Details window  (Figure  2.8).  It  is  possible  to  widen  the  range  of  details  here,  with  e.g.
documents (Figure 2.9).
In the Inspections menu (Figure 2.10)  a series of information can be assigned to the inspection. The
figure shows the Location tab, and how the position of the inspection is given is zoomed in the
figure. It is possible to show the location in the 3D viewer window also. The inspections can be
searched based on status, zones, inspection type or sources.
The findings can be recorded under the Record findings menu. The possible meta-data here assures
that the finding is precisely described, can be traced to a campaign1, can be linked to documents and
location.
The findings are evaluated in the Evaluate findings menu after the finding has been recorded and
was given a status “complete”. In this step the severity status is set or corrective action is initiated
for the finding. It is also possible to decide if it is to be included in a Codam report. The linked asset
model and mitigation can be given.
The Findings tool makes it possible display the condition of findings as well as to locate them in the
3D viewer.
The Insp Workflow / Worklist tool is design to track the jobs or tasks that are assigned to a given
user.  This  way  the  progress  of  someone  can  be  seen,  as  well  as  possible  the  reassign  the
responsibility to someone else if needed.
1 It is possible to register ad-hoc findings also
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Figure 2.6: Survey portal - Campaigns
Figure 2.7: Survey portal - Work packages
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Figure 2.8: Survey portal – Work packages (work-flow) – Details
Figure 2.9: Survey portal - Work packages (work-flow) – Documents
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Figure 2.10: Survey portal - Work packages (work-flow) – Inspections
Figure 2.11: Survey portal - Work packages (work-flow) – Record findings
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C2.4 Analysis portal
The purpose of the Analysis portal (SIMS-a) is to enable storing, retrieving and managing computer
models of structural assets. As it is written in the main part of the thesis the models are stored as
'As-is' Assurance models (AAm) which contain the geometry, permanent and variable loads as well
as the scripts to make the analyses run. How much the AAm models represent the as-is condition is
reflected in  the AAm status.  How much the results  of the analyses comply with regulations  is
expressed in the AAa status. In addition there are two more statuses, the AAQC and the AASAS
status which compile into the AAc status, which is the highest level compliance status for the 'As-is'
Assurance models. The AAa status and the AAQC status are manually set by the responsibly for
structural analysis, while the AASAS (Figure 2.15) is a program generated list. 
The  models  are  stored  in  so  called  AA  folders (Figure  2.15)  which  provide  the  function  of
maintaining and archiving models connected to a certain Major Structure Area of a facility (see
section  2.2 for the list of areas). The 3D viewer model have their own folders too. All the AA
folders receive an Facility ID (FID). It is possible to define a child / parent relation between the
models, and the interconnectedness defined by the child / parent relations is defined by referring to
the appropriate FID.
The  AA folders  have  tags  that  define  the  analysis  type  (storm,  fatigue,  ULS,  ALS);  the  used
software; the responsible persons for the analysis; the title and revision of the report that documents
the model and analysis.
In Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13 the Current AA portfolio tool is shown, first in status, afterwards in
edit mode. The status mode gives a very high level overview of the AAm and AAc statuses of the
different Major Structure Areas stored in the SIMS system. It  is a matrix where all the needed
analysis types are listed in the top row (Blast-ULS, Blast-ALS, etc.) and it is color-coded cells that
show status for a given Facility / Area. 
In the edit mode figure (Figure 2.13) the area zoomed in  shows how the necessity for a model for a
given area and hazard can be defined. It is a drop-down menu for each cell where the user can select
if the model/analysis is required. In the figures it can be seen that SIMS contains similar portfolio
overview windows for study analyses and 3D viewer models also (on the left, under the Current AA
Portfolio menu).
In Figure 2.14 the Change register tool of the Analyse portal is shown. This is where the different
changes can be registered, as well as AA folders and 3D viewer folders can be linked to the change
which signals that these being affected by the change. The source of the change can be a finding of
corrosion  or  crack,  a  planned  modification,  revised  environmental  loads,  revised  regulatory
requirements or damage (from boat collision or dropped object). In Figure 2.14 the highlighted area
shows the meta-data that can be provided to give a description of the change. It can also be seen that
in the tabs at the top documents, AA folders and 3D folders can be linked to the change right away.
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Figure 2.12: Analysis portal - Current AA portfolio
Figure 2.13: Analysis portal - Current AA portfolio - Edit mode
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Figure 2.14: Analysis portal - Change register
Figure 2.15: Analysis portal - AA folders with AASAS checklist
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C2.5 Ensure portal
The  CODAM tool in the Ensure portal is used for issuing standardized, generated reports to the
Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA). It is controlled within SIMS which findings will be included in
the CODAM report by an attribute status (“send to codam” = yes). The DB Reports tool has been
programmed to enable the creation of customer specific predefined standard reports. 
The KPI summaries tool in Figure 2.16 shows a Structure Integrity Scorecard page that allows the
user to see an overall view of the integrity of the facility at a top level. It will provide information
on number of red and yellow flags in the SIMS database for current year as well as earlier year. It
further provides trending on how the condition is in current year compared to earlier years, i.e. are
the number of issues that needs attention reduced or increased compared to earlier years.
The other reports that can be generated here are the ASIS report which are usually generated at the
end of a year to provide and integrity performance overview at both high or detailed levels. The
other reports available are Analysis Change Task Summary (ACT), Structure Condition Anomaly
Summary (SCA), Design, Fabrication, Installation, Operation Resumé (DFIO), Structure Analysis
Summary (SAS).
The Activity Plan tool in Figure 2.17 is a project manager tool which is tailor made for SIMS. The
structure of defineable items is Program / Project / Task. It is possible to view a Gantt diagram.
C2.6 Administrate
In the Administrative portal not all functions are available for all users. E.g. functions that define
user access rights can only be used by people who have elevated rights.
It is possible here to set the contents of the SIMS News, possible to define templates for checklists,
input answers to local frequently asked questions (FAQ) that are typical for a given function.
The portal deals with the 'bulk' import functions of SIMS too. It is possible to make FMD group, 3D
viewer and asset group imports.
The definition of the FMD group is that a structural member in real life may have to be modeled by
several members in a computer  model.  An FMD group holds these members together, hence a
flooded member detection on one of the members can trigger an internal fill condition status on
other computer model members too.
As it was mentioned earlier the 3D viewer models are similar to the structural analysis models
without  loads.  An internal  module  of  SIMS can display  the  models  within  SIMS and provide
various  information  in  the  3D viewer  screen.  E.g.  color-code members   based  on member  fill
condition status or show which member an inspection (finding) is linked to.
The Asset group is a set of members and nodes that constitute a portion of the 3D view model, e.g.
jacket,  risers,  boat bumpers, elevation or row (the same as what Major Structure Area is).  The
reason for having asset groups is the have a better way of diverse display options in the 3D viewer,
e.g. to be able to display only a certain, selected part of the structure and hide other parts which
would necessarily complicate the display.
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Figure 2.16: Ensure portal - KPI summaries
Figure 2.17: Ensure portal - Activity plan
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